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ABSTRACT 
This research is intended to improve the techniques available to safety assessors and 
provide tools for decision making in safety management. This is done by fostering a new 
paradigm for safety management, which forms the basis for the performance measurement 
and process mapping/monitoring (PMPM) method. The research examines safety 
management philosophies and compares methods, including fault trees, Bayesian 
Networks, and the functional resonance analysis method (FRAM). This examination is 
intended to provide a broad understanding of the fundamental safety and risk concepts. The 
understanding provides the background knowledge to undertake an adaptive safety 
approach for an Arctic shipping application. The FRAM was adopted for Arctic ship 
navigation: where three captains were interviewed to form the basis for a functional map 
of the way ship navigation work can be performed. Also, variations in the ways ship 
navigation work is performed was recorded from the captains to help understand some of 
the ways captains may adjust their work to the dynamic conditions they face. Two additions 
to the FRAM are presented in this work: 1) functional signatures and 2) system 
performance measurements. Functional signatures provide a method for assessors to 
animate the FRAM and visualize the functional dynamics over time. System performance 
measurement provides a way to bring an element of quantification to the FRAM. 
Quantification can then be used to help compare different scenarios and support decisions. 
These additions to the FRAM have been demonstrated using data from an ice management 
ship simulator experiment. The demonstration can be used as a basis to continue future 
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analysis of using this method in the maritime domain or transfer this approach to other 
domains.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Problem statement 
Historically, shipping in the Arctic has been limited compared to shipping in more 
temperate regions. The Arctic contains large seasonal variabilities in environmental 
conditions, such as ice conditions, air temperature, and daylight. The conditions in the 
winter season are challenging for vessels to transit and has largely been reserved for 
specialized vessels. However, the summer season offers a window of opportunity for a 
larger number of less capable ships to transit the water ways safely. In recent years, a trend 
of lessening sea ice in the Arctic has been observed (Arctic Council, 2009; Moore et al., 
2018; Petty et al., 2018;  Petty, 2018).   This trend has made the window of opportunity 
larger for less capable ships to transit the Arctic, which has led shipping companies to 
consider using the Arctic as a viable alternative to their traditional routes. Coincidentally, 
shipping traffic in the Arctic has increased in recent years and that trend is expected to 
continue (Marchenko, 2015). Considering the limited experience of ship operators 
transiting the Arctic, the projection of increased shipping in the Arctic brings about 
concerns about safety and the impact it could have on the environment. 
A project was awarded by the Lloyd’s Register Foundation (LRF) to a consortium of 
universities (Memorial University of Newfoundland, Aalto University, University of 
Helsinki, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, and Hamburg University of 
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Technology) to investigate areas of uncertainty regarding Arctic shipping risks. The project 
has a large scope that covers a number of risk related topics with respect to Arctic shipping.   
The topics in the project address both the probability and consequence elements of the risk 
framework, including accident prevention, hull structure, ship systems, ice load modelling, 
harsh climate and weather operations, accident consequence characterization, oil spill 
modelling, ecosystem response to oil spills,  of the risk framework. This thesis dissertation 
focusses on the accident prevention element. 
In the risk framework, improvements in accident prevention can translate to lower 
likelihood of accidents, thus reducing the risk to Arctic going ships and the environment. 
Accident prevention in Arctic shipping has many uncertainties that stem from the limited 
experience and harsh, dynamic operational conditions. There are many areas that 
improvements in understanding can be made to the prevention of shipping accidents, 
including, ship technologies, human factors, organizational factors, and environmental 
factors. It should also be noted that addressing the uncertainties of each of these areas 
individually may result in an over-simplified understanding of accident processes. These 
inter-relations are a source of uncertainty that should be addressed to obtain a more 
thorough understanding of accident processes. The main goal of this thesis is to address 
some of these uncertainties regarding accident prevention in Arctic shipping to help better 
inform the larger risk model for Arctic shipping. 
1.2. Overview of safety management 
Before jumping straight to examining shipping accident processes, it is important to 
consider some approaches to and philosophies of safety management because they will 
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determine what one might look for as one assesses various processes, and will ultimately 
affect how one may manage safety. Consider the evolution of industrial safety as put forth 
by Hale & Hovden (1998):  the three ages of industrial safety. Hale & Hoven state that 
since the industrial revolution (and up until roughly 1998), safety has evolved and can be 
characterized by 3 ages: the age of technical factors, the age of human factors, and the age 
of safety management. The age of technical factors began in the late 1800s, the age of 
human factors began in the late 1960s, and the age of safety management began in the early 
1990s, where each age has not replaced the preceding age but rather it has built on to it, 
thus increasing the scope and complexity of assessments. In recent years, the scope and 
complexity of safety assessments has continued to increase, which Glendon et al. (2006) 
has characterized as the integrative age. The integrative age has continued to add factors 
that build on past assessments to produce more complex, albeit more comprehensive 
models. 
The evolving nature of safety management has resulted in many changes, but one common 
theme is that the focus of assessments has been on accidents. More and more factors have 
been deemed important to safety assessments by considering accidents as the focal point of 
assessments. Hollnagel (2014) argued that safety is the absence of accidents and to make 
accidents the primary focus for study is inconsistent with the way we investigate other 
topics in science. For instance, chemistry makes chemicals the focal point of study, and 
biology makes living organisms the primary focus, not their absence. To study safety in a 
manner akin to other areas of science research, it would be appropriate to also consider safe 
operations as a focal point. 
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Examining safety through safe operations has forced assessors to think more broadly about 
the mechanisms that may lead to success or failure. Borys et al (2009) have said that this 
new perspective has brought about a new age, the adaptive age. In this age adaptation is no 
longer only seen as a failure causing mechanism, it is also essential to success. This new 
age of safety is just beginning and offers many opportunities to contribute new knowledge. 
New contributions made in this age will give safety assessors a chance to view operations 
through this lens and determine the practical utility of this approach. As the understanding 
of adaptation in operations increases, it may offer more effective holistic management 
approaches. A timeline of the ages of safety can be seen in Figure 1.1, depicting how each 
age has built on the previous age. 
Some profound limitations in the management of safety have been discussed by Aven et al. 
(2015). Stating that current risk frameworks have difficulty dealing with deep uncertainty, 
surprises, and the unforeseen. Aven et al. (2015) also posit that, in dynamic operations, it 
may not be appropriate to prescribe a single solution to manage risks. Rather, it may be 
more appropriate to prescribe a dynamic set of solutions to adapt to the changing 
Figure 1.1: Timeline of the ages of safety 
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conditions. The broader perspective of examining all outcomes of an operation when 
considering safety or risk, which is characteristic of the adaptive age, has potential to 
address these issues by understanding how processes are managed over a wide range of 
outcomes. 
Also in conventional risk assessment methods, operations are modelled as a collection of 
components that can contribute to operational success or failure, both individually and 
collectively. Again these traditional approaches perform well in well-defined and well-
understood situations. Operations that are made up of mainly technical components are the 
most well-suited to these conventional methods as relationships between components are 
more linear and it is easier to estimate the collective effect of components. However, 
systems with more human interactions have been harder to predict using conventional 
methods (Perrow, 1984). This may be because relationships between technologies and 
humans are more complicated. Vicente (2004) has attributed the lack of understanding of 
relationships between technologies and humans to the reductionist approach adopted by the 
scientific community (and implicitly by society). In the reductionist approach, the scope of 
problems can be reduced by excluding anything outside of the investigator’s purview. This 
technique is effective for studying narrow scope problems and has allowed many great 
discoveries in science. Since this approach is the most commonly adopted in the scientific 
community, most of our collective knowledge is divided in specific domains, each 
encompassing a great depth of knowledge but, with poorly understood relationships 
between domains. The humanities and technological sciences are typically investigated 
separately, and thus knowledge about relationships between these domains is low. 
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An underlying philosophy of the adaptive age is that adaptation is present in successes and 
failures of an operation, which has implications about how operations should be managed. 
Operational adaptation should not necessarily be eliminated or minimized to improve 
safety, rather adaptation should be understood in specific sets of operational conditions, 
and minimized or constrained when appropriate. The limited understanding that exists 
around the new adaptive approach has led others to explore concepts of resilience in safety 
and risk contexts. In this context, adaptation within industrial applications can be seen as a 
source of resilience, allowing the operation to persist when subjected to adverse conditions. 
Qualitatively, adaptation has been observed as a source of resilience in industrial 
applications but it has been difficult to measure. 
Ayyub (2014) proposes using system performance measurement as a signal that can lend 
quantification to resilience. By tracking system performance over time, assessors can gain 
a sense of the level of performance that is being achieved. This may allow the assessor to 
answer questions such as: is the system achieving high performance?, Is the system 
experiencing losses?, And does the system recover quickly after losses? Answering these 
questions may provide information that can help understand the level of resilience that is 
present in a given system. This is important information for managing an operation. 
However, this technique does not provide information about where sources of resilience or 
vulnerabilities may be located within the system which is equally important for managing. 
In order to locate sources of resilience and vulnerabilities it is necessary to map the inner 
workings of a system and track operational dynamics as performance measurements are 
collected. Hollnagel (2012) presented the functional resonance analysis method (FRAM), 
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which is well suited to tracking operational dynamics of socio-technical systems. The 
FRAM maps operational activities and tracks variability in the outputs of those activities. 
The variability can provide a sense of the level of adaptation present in the operation. The 
FRAM also provides guidance about the types of relationships that may exist between 
activities, which can be especially useful for understanding relationships between human 
activities and activities done by technologies. Though the FRAM is useful for modelling 
dynamics of operations and improving the understanding of the systems inner workings, it 
does not provide a framework for quantification. 
Returning to Arctic shipping safety, it can be reasoned that it is well-suited to adaptive 
safety approaches. Arctic shipping is a socio-technical system with many uncertainties. 
Humans play major roles in the outcome of the operation. In fact the main objective of the 
ship operator is to adjust the ship’s conditions if needed to avoid hazards.  Therefore, an 
appropriate way to investigate ship operations is to use the FRAM to track the inner 
workings of the operation, and use system performance measurement as a way to include 
quantification of performance. 
1.3. Background Knowledge and Gaps 
In safety and risk, there is a need to improve the knowledge base in all areas, but there are 
significant knowledge gaps involving human factors and in turn organizational factors, as 
organizational actions are performed by humans. The lack of understanding of human 
factors in many safety and risk methodologies has been attributed to the reductionist 
approach, a technique for acquiring and organizing knowledge (Vicente, 2004). The 
approach is based on reducing problems into their most elementary parts and studying them 
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in relative isolation. The understanding of the collective parts could then be used to 
understand the whole problem. This approach has been widely used for scientific inquiry 
over the last several centuries and it has been very valuable to the knowledge that has been 
gained to date, allowing for the discovery of the atom and mapping of the human genome. 
Figure 1.2 shows the reductionist approach to knowledge acquisition. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: The reductionist approach to knowledge acquisition 
Figure 1.2 illustrates that this approach produces knowledge that is largely divided by 
disciplinary boundaries. This allows for study at great depth within each discipline. The 
underlying assumption is that the scope of study can be reduced to the most fundamental 
parts and collective understandings can be obtained by combining the knowledge of the 
parts. This approach works well for obtaining collective understanding of linear systems as 
the whole can be understood as the sum of the parts, but leaves gaps in the collective 
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knowledge base for non-linear systems. The reductionist approach also allows for more 
objective studies of knowledge to take place. As the scope of the problem is reduced, the 
number of influencing factors in that problem will be reduced, thus making it easier to 
perform “controlled” experiments, which allows for more objectivity. Despite the scientific 
knowledge gained using this approach, it has produced knowledge gaps in some areas that 
span multiple disciplines. 
One of the most useful aspects of the reductionist approach is that it has allowed the 
advancers of knowledge to cope with complexity. Obtaining knowledge involves 
abstractions of observations from the world, which are combined with concepts that are 
created in our own minds. Also, because we are not purely observers, but also participants 
in the world we are studying, the complexity of relations between concepts and 
observations increases. Figure 1.3 depicts the complexity of knowledge abstraction, which 
the reductionist approach has helped us cope with through organization and reduction of 
scope. 
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Figure 1.3: Complexity of knowledge abstraction 
Another approach that can be used to cope with complexity is the holistic approach. This 
approach is different from the reductionist approach in that it focuses on understanding the 
relationships that exist between different elements and studies them as a whole. In the 
holistic approach, it may also be necessary to reduce the scope of study to manage 
complexity, but not to the level of the elementary parts. The scope may be reduced to a 
relatively small system initially, but could gradually become larger as relations and 
elements are understood. In order to produce collective knowledge in this approach, 
knowledge of individual studies must be synthesized. The process of synthesizing 
knowledge may not be as straightforward as simply combining the sum of the parts. 
Synthesis may require studies to be re-examined as a new whole to obtain collective 
knowledge. This process of using the holistic approach is shown in Figure 1.4. 
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Figure 1.4: Holistic approach to knowledge acquisition 
The holistic approach may also make it difficult to maintain objective understandings as it 
is difficult to isolate factors in this approach. In this approach, phenomena will be examined 
as they are experienced by observers. This can lead to subjective explanations of 
phenomena that contain biases arising from the way they were experienced. Synthesis can 
help provide more confidence to understandings that are obtained using this inherently 
biased approach. By synthesizing subjective understandings of the observed phenomena, 
there is an opportunity to check if the phenomena are seen in the same way across multiple 
studies. If the phenomena are observed in the same way after the studies have been 
synthesized, this will provide confidence that a consistent understanding of the phenomena 
has been obtained despite the biases. 
Given the preceding discussion on reductionism and holism, it may lead to the question, 
which approach is better? There is no general answer to that question. Which method is the 
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most appropriate will be largely determined by context. Reductionism and holism are 
paradigms that will shape the way the world is viewed, thus the way scientific inquiries are 
approached. Each approach may have value in certain contexts, and it may even show more 
value to use both approaches. However, since reductionism has been the preferred scientific 
approach for the last several centuries, there may be immediate knowledge gaps that can 
be addressed by using a holistic approach. 
An emerging domain of knowledge over the past half century is complexity theory. 
Complexity theory is founded on the holistic paradigm and provides some structure to 
assessments of complex systems. Complexity theory is a composite of four other domains: 
1) Self organization theory, 2) Non-linear systems theory, 3) Network theory, and 4) 
Adaptive systems theory (Colchester, 2016). This composite definition of complexity 
theory can be seen in Figure 1.5. 
 
Figure 1.5: Composite definition of complexity theory 
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The four composite domains of complexity theory provide frameworks that can be used to 
understand characteristics of complex systems. These related domains can be described as 
follows: 
 Self organization theory provides some understanding of how local interactions 
between system elements can bring about global organization patterns. For instance, 
interactions between individual birds can give rise to the “V shape” of the flock as 
they fly. There is no centralized coordination center responsible for this global 
phenomena of the flock: it is done by self organization among the individual birds. 
Another example may be how interactions between local businesses form global 
patterns of organization in regional, national, and international markets.  
 Non-linear systems theory provides a basis to understand non-linear phenomena. 
Since linear systems have been defined previously as a system that can be 
represented by the sum of its parts, then a non-linear system is a system that can 
produce a whole that is different than the sum of its parts. For instance, adding bees 
and flowers to a garden or forest can produce changes that are much greater than 
the addition of flowers and bees.  
 Network theory provides an understanding of connectivity between system 
elements. A global flight map would be an example of a network that represents 
connectivity between cities.  
 Adaptive systems theory provides some basis to understand local adaptation within 
systems. Competition and/or coordination between local agents in systems can lead 
to changing conditions that require adaptations to maintain system functionality. 
14 
 
 
This can be seen in our road transportation system, wherein agents make adaptation 
locally in roadways to either coordinate or compete for road space, which can 
produce a number of different outcomes. 
Another common concept in scientific inquiry is causality. This search for cause and effect 
relationships has been a cornerstone for modelling the world we live in. However, causality 
manifests in different ways in linear systems and non-linear systems, as depicted in Figure 
1.6. Linear causation is unidirectional, meaning that a cause will produce an effect but an 
effect will have no influence on a cause. This conception of causality has been effective for 
linear system modelling. Non-linear causality includes two way influence between cause 
and effect. The cause will influence an effect and the effect can then feedback to influence 
the cause. This process of non-linear causation might be difficult to imagine since we 
typically tend to imagine cause and effect relationships occurring sequentially. This is 
related to our linear conception of time. Consider the representation of non-linear causation 
with respect to time in Figure 1.6. This figure displays how we can project a future goal 
and that future goal can feedback to influence how we might act in the present. For example, 
when cooking a meal you might project what your meal will look like after it’s cooked to 
decide on the actions you will take to prepare it. The presence of feedback loop(s) creates 
non-linearity. 
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Figure 1.6: Linear and non-linear causality 
Another concept that is present in complexity theory, and the holistic paradigm, is 
emergence. This concept is akin to causality in linear systems as it tries to provide reason 
to outcomes. Whereas outcomes can be thought to have occurred because of their causes in 
linear systems, in complex (non-linear) systems outcomes are thought to have occurred 
because of emergent patterns of organization between system elements. Emergence is a 
product of four properties in complex systems (Colchester, 2017): 1) Non-linearity, 2) 
Synergies, 3) Self organization, 4) Pattern formation. See the four properties of emergence 
in Figure 1.7. 
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Figure 1.7: Four properties of emergence 
Emergence can be influenced by feedback loops in non-linear systems. Multiple feedback 
processes have the potential to greatly amplify outcomes, to seem as if an unexpected 
outcome emerged from a modest set of initial conditions. Self-organization that occurs 
between local system elements can give rise to emergent outcomes of the system. As the 
local system elements self-organize, outcomes emerge from patterns of organization that 
are due to the combined effects of multi-element self-organization, making it difficult to 
determine any direct causal link to the outcome. Synergies between system elements play 
an important role in emergence. Synergies are the combined interactions between elements 
that produce a combined effect that do not equal the sum of the parts, see Figure 1.8. Two 
parameters responsible for synergies in systems are differentiation and integration. 
Differentiation is the component that allows for specialization and integration defines how 
specialized parts are configured to produce synergistic outcomes. Organizations have 
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specialized workers who, when properly integrated, can produce outcomes greater than the 
same number of unspecialized, improperly integrated, people. The example in Figure 1.8 
illustrates how a collection of specialized body parts when integrated properly can form a 
human. The same parts, when integrated differently, may not synergize to a human, but 
maybe another life form. 
 
Figure 1.8: Illustration of synergies 
Emergence can also be characterized on a spectrum ranging from weak to strong emergence 
(Figure 1.9). Weakly emergent phenomena are phenomena that are produced through 
synergistic interactions, without a linear causal explanation, but a causal relationship may 
be determined after that emergent phenomena is incorporated into a model. This form of 
emergence is called epistemological emergence. The phenomena seems emergent because 
it hasn’t been experienced before. Weak emergence can describe unforeseen outcomes or 
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surprises, but after they have been observed they can be incorporated into the epistemology. 
On the stronger end of the emergence spectrum there is ontological emergence. Ontological 
emergence is related to the nature of being, and in that sense the emergent phenomena just 
seems to occur without any (or very little) understanding of the mechanisms that would 
produce it. A common example of strong emergence is how consciousness emerges from 
the nervous system. There is a grey area between the distinction of epistemological 
emergence and ontological emergence. If new epistemology is obtained that provides an 
explanation for a phenomena that was once thought to be ontological, the strength of that 
emergent phenomena would decrease. Thus, one could ask was that emergent phenomena 
actually ontological in the first place. Regardless of the labels that are placed on emergent 
phenomena, one should have an appreciation for the range of strength for those emergent 
phenomena. 
 
Figure 1.9: Strong and weak emergence 
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These concepts from complexity theory can help provide an understanding of what a 
complex system is (Colchester, 2016). A complex system is said to have four properties 
(Figure 1.10): Numerosity, Non-linearity, Connectivity, and adaptation. While these 
properties will vary from system to system, they may be used as measures of complexity. 
 Numerosity: The number of elements in a system. A system with more elements 
may be seen as more complex. 
 Non-linearity: A system’s sensitivity to initial conditions. Non-linearity will be 
demonstrated when small changes in initial conditions produce disproportionally 
large changes in the system’s outcomes. A system that exhibits this non-linear 
behavior is complex. 
 Connectivity: Connectivity describes the relationships between the system 
elements. The number of connections between elements can be used as a measure 
of complexity, with more connections being more complex. 
 Adaptation: Adaptation represents the system’s ability to self-organize and make 
local adjustments to perturbations and maintain functionality. The number of 
potential/actual adjustments in a system may be seen as a measure of complexity. 
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Figure 1.10: Defining a complex system 
1.4. Safety and risk 
The words safety and risk have often been used as antonyms, safety being used to describe 
everything that produces a good outcome, and risk to describe anything that produces a bad 
outcome. The dichotomy of this perspective can be seen as a by-product of the reductionist 
approach. Safety and risk have become divided disciplines. These very closely related 
topics have their own distinct bodies of knowledge and terminology. To further explain the 
fragmentation of knowledge, knowledge within these disciplines is largely divided into 
sub-topics of technological factors, human factors, and organizational factors. The 
reductionist approach has produced valuable specialized knowledge, but has left gaps in 
the collective knowledge pertaining to the relationships between sub-topics of safety and 
risk. There is potential to address these fundamental knowledge gaps in safety and risk by 
using a holistic approach.  
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The safety and risk domains have a plethora of tools that can be used to understand specific 
applications. This thesis is intended to make contributions to safety and risk in a way that 
would be applicable to Arctic shipping. Arctic shipping contains considerable involvement 
of technical, human and organization factors. These type of operations are called socio-
technical systems. Moreover, Arctic shipping has many elements with high connectivity, 
non-linear behaviors, and many local adaptations so Arctic shipping can also be categorized 
as a complex socio-technical system. Thus, this characterization should provide the context 
for examining some of the available safety management approaches and selecting an 
appropriate one to investigate Arctic shipping.  
Safety is important to all participants of an operation. Operations can span many different 
domains, thus there have been many different approaches to safety that are derived from 
the fundamentals of certain domains. This is consistent with the “siloed” knowledge bases 
of the reductionist method that is described in Figure 1.2. Engineering and other math-
heavy sciences have been in favor of risk based approaches to safety, which typically allows 
for quantifiable analytics of operations. The quantifiable nature of analysis allows 
engineers to use familiar mathematical tools, which provides some comfort in adopting 
risk-based approaches. Quantification also provides a basis for objective analysis, which 
can help with model “validation” and can provide confidence about certain operational 
insights to help manage safety. The underlying philosophy of risk-based approaches is that 
safety will be improved by avoiding (or mitigating) risks.  Other domains that are more 
comfortable with purely qualitative analysis, such as, psychology, kinesiology, and 
medicine, have made other contributions to safety, which are not necessarily consistent 
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with risk-based approaches. These more qualitative approaches are based on the philosophy 
that safety can be improved by promoting safe practices, thus avoiding risks that one may 
not have even characterized in a quantitative approach. A main source of supportive 
evidence for these safety-based approaches is in high-reliability organizations (HRO’s) 
(Klein, 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). HROs are defined as organizations that are called 
into action in elevated risk situations and maintain an impressive safety record, such as 
firefighters, paramedics, and certain military applications. In these fields, they have very 
little control over the level of risk that they have to operate in, but their attention to safety 
has proven to be a significant contributor to their impressive safety records. The qualitative 
nature of these approaches has made it difficult to merge with conventional risk-based 
approaches which provides a sense of “validation” to support safety and business decisions. 
The word “validation” appears in quotations in the preceding discussion about risk-based 
and safety-based approaches. That is because what is typically referred to as validation may 
be more appropriately termed calibration. The process for developing a model to inform 
safety management is displayed in Figure 1.11. A model is built from information, events, 
and data of the past. The model is then checked using the data. If the models outputs are in 
close enough agreement to the data, the model will be accepted. Once the model has been 
accepted, it will then be used to make predictions of the future, and those predictions will 
be the basis for safety management decisions. In this sense, it may be more appropriate to 
think of the model as calibrated to make a prediction of the future that is similar to what 
has been seen in the past. While this assumption that the future will be like the past works 
some of the time, it is not true for all cases and can leave model users susceptible to 
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surprises. Therefore, the model is not generally valid either, but only valid for the past cases 
that have been used to build, check, and accept the model. The term calibration implies that 
the results produced by the model will fall within the calibrated range and that there may 
be a need to re-calibrate the model from time to time. 
 
Figure 1.11: Model validation vs. calibration 
In order to further understand some of the uncertainties that are inherently present in 
traditional risk-based approaches the “4 knowns” can be examined. The “4 knowns” is a 
popular knowledge characterization tool that is used in safety, risk, and project planning 
applications. The “4 knowns” state that knowledge can be characterized by 4 types of 
knowns: the known knowns, the known unknowns, the unknown knowns, and the unknown 
unknowns. The known knowns represent things that are known to be true, known unknowns 
represent things that are known to be not well understood, unknown knowns represent 
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things that are believed to be known but are actually misunderstood, and unknown 
unknowns represent the things that have neither been thought of or observed before. This 
has been a useful tool to help remind decision makers about different forms of uncertainty 
that may exist in knowledge that is used to inform their decisions. However, this way of 
characterizing knowledge has epistemological flaws. Most notably, the characterization of 
known knowns implies that such knowledge is known with 100% certainty. From an 
epistemological perspective, knowledge can be thought of as beliefs of varying strength, 
where the strength varies in relation to evidence that supports that belief. While certain 
beliefs that have immense supporting evidence can be very strong, there will always be a 
possibility of observing contradictory evidence to that belief, thus preventing any 
knowledge from being 100% known. Figure 1.12 shows the 4 knowns as they pertain to 
the strength of belief perspective for knowledge characterization. Belief can exist on a 
spectrum of strength related to supporting evidence, existing somewhere between 0% to 
just less than 100%. Unknown unknowns can be characterized as 0% strength of belief 
because there has been no idea or observation yet to substantiate a belief. Known unknowns 
will typically be characterized as weak beliefs, as there is enough evidence to support the 
awareness of a phenomenon but not enough evidence to understand its mechanisms and 
interrelations. A grey area exists between unknown knowns and known knowns. While 
known knowns will typically be the most supported and strongest beliefs, unknown knowns 
will also be strong beliefs. Both are said to be known, thus implying a strong belief, but 
one is said to be true and the other a misunderstood truth. However, it will not be known if 
there is a misunderstanding of the knowledge until some evidence is observed that 
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contradicts the prior belief. In order to counteract this inherent uncertainty of knowledge 
characterization, it is advantageous to constantly challenge your prior beliefs and continue 
to ensure that evidence is supporting them. 
 
Figure 1.12: 4 knowns vs. strength of belief 
Although both schools of thought - risk-based and safety-based approaches - have their 
own respective merits and shortcomings, the most effective approach will be to marry the 
two approaches. This movement has been seen in recent literature, under such names as 
Safety II and Safety Differently (Dekker, 2014; Hollnagel, 2014b). Both names are 
representative of a past where the go-to approach in safety and risk was to focus on 
accidents and try to prevent them. Safety II incorporates successful operations to build on 
the traditional accident focused approach, and claims to provide the most promise for 
improvement to safety going forward. Safety Differently, similarly suggests that safety has 
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traditionally been approached through the study of accidents, but we should be thinking 
about safety differently, specifically by also studying successful operations. It is important 
to point out that these movements do not suggest that the ways of the past be forgotten, or 
that one approach should be chosen over the other. Rather, the way forward is to find ways 
to synthesize the two approaches to formulate the best understandings of industrial 
applications, which will help inform safety management of the future. 
Safety II and Safety Differently are influenced by state-of-the-art understandings of human 
factors in industrial operations. Human factors have been and still are a major contributor 
to industrial accidents (Rothblum, 2000; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2004; U.S. Department of 
Energy, 2009). Traditional safety management strategies searched for “root causes” of 
accidents and then removed those causes. This strategy would often manifest as a human 
error being deemed responsible, resulting in removing the person responsible for the error, 
and replacing them with another person. While this use of personal accountability has the 
ability to shape human performance in a positive way in terms of safety, there are questions 
regarding the limits of positive change that can be enabled this way. By considering human 
factors in the context of how they influence accidents and successes, a different perspective 
is obtained. While operational adjustments made by humans can be seen as a contributor to 
accidents (and it is), when examining successful operations, it is observed that those 
adjustments also contribute significantly to success (Hollnagel, 2014b). Work in many 
industries is under-specified and outcomes can be difficult to foresee, thus those industries 
rely on operational adjustments to have success. Most of the time, those operational 
adjustments do result in success for the operation. The adjustment is made by the worker 
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in real-time, with the best information available at that time, with the intentions of having 
a good outcome. From this perspective, when an operational adjustment made by a worker 
has a bad outcome, and then that person is replaced by another person to improve safety, it 
can be questioned whether this is the best way to improve safety in operations that rely so 
heavily on operational adjustments for success? The best way to improve safety for these 
types of operations is to understand the roles of the workers, how their actions might 
influence operational outcomes, and how they might be better supported to make the 
“correct” decisions more often. 
This understanding of human factors aligns well with the concept of system safety. System 
safety is an approach that brings the system paradigm to safety. By thinking about industrial 
applications as systems of interconnected, non-linear process with local adjustments, it can 
change the way safety has traditionally been thought of. Figure 1.13 shows the implications 
of using the reductionist or system paradigm to view industrial operations. While the 
operation will remain constant regardless of the paradigm, the way it is seen will change. 
Each paradigm acts as a lens that the operation is viewed through, thus changing what is 
seen, and/or what is deemed important. By seeing the operation under a different paradigm, 
there is the potential to reshape old or form new safety concepts that will help inform future 
safety management knowledge.  
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Figure 1.13: Reductionist vs. system paradigm for safety 
The functional resonance analysis method (FRAM) is a method that uses the systems 
approach to understand functionality for sociotechnical systems. By using functionality, 
rather than error, as the lens to view operations through, new understandings of industrial 
safety can be obtained. Since functionality can be examined regardless of outcome, this 
method is in line with the Safety II approach. When studying functionality, the FRAM 
places emphasis on functions, their connectivity, variability, and local adaptations, which 
are believed to be the main sources for variable outcomes in sociotechnical operations 
under the FRAM paradigm. This paradigm provides a basis to reexamine safety concepts 
and update knowledge, if necessary, as seen in Figure 1.14. 
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Figure 1.14: FRAM paradigm for safety management 
 
Another concept that is in line with the Safety II approach is system resilience, resilience 
being the study of how systems persist in the face of adverse conditions. System 
performance measurement as a means to gauge resilience is of particular interest. This 
approach was presented by Ayyub (2014) and provides a framework for quantifying 
performance regardless of outcome, which is relevant to making comparisons of the 
outcomes. The framework suggests measuring the performance of a system over time as 
seen in Figure 1.15. The performance can be expressed, for example, as a percentage of the 
expected or desired performance for that system. There is no generic metric that can be 
used to measure system performance across different applications. The framework does, 
however, specify some suggested metrics for certain applications and advocates that 
suitable metrics should be representative of the main objective of the system being 
assessed. 
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Figure 1.15: Measuring system performance over time (after Ayyub (2014)) 
1.5.  Scope of work and contribution 
This work provides contributions to safety research methodologies and insight to Arctic 
ship navigation safety. The contribution to safety research methods is from the creation of 
a performance measurement and process mapping/monitoring (PMPM) technique for 
safety management. The contribution to ship navigation safety is through the application 
of the PMPM method as it is developed throughout this thesis. This thesis is a manuscript 
style thesis, which consists of a collection of four manuscripts that appear as chapters 2, 3, 
4, 5, respectively. The work in these manuscripts is described in the following. 
Chapter 2 provides a state-of-the-art review of safety methods and philosophies with a 
comparison of three safety research tools: fault trees, Bayesian networks, and the FRAM. 
The comparison used a simple case study of a propane feed heater system to, as objectively 
as possible, compare the 3 methods. The conclusion from the comparison was that a best 
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method could not be determined, but that each method provides different perspectives to 
the understanding of the same system. The choice of an appropriate method to investigate 
safety depends on the understandings that are desired by the user. Some highlights from 
the comparison study can be seen in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1: Comparison of the FT, BN, and FRAM methods 
 
Amount of 
information 
required 
Type of 
information 
required 
Accident 
explanation 
Focus of 
investigation 
Guided 
system 
description 
Quantifiable 
Fault 
Tree 
lowest 
components, 
logical 
relationships 
and individual 
failure data 
Causal Failure No Yes 
Bayesian 
Network 
more 
components 
and CPT's 
Causal Failure No Yes 
FRAM most 
Functions, 
functional 
interactions 
and variability 
Emergent 
Failure and 
success 
Yes No 
 
Chapter 3 explores the development a FRAM model for Arctic ship navigation. A FRAM 
model for Arctic ship navigation was created by interviewing experienced ship navigators 
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(Figure 1.16). By probing the interviewees on the functionality (functions and variability) 
of ship navigation, insight was gained about the ship navigation processes and variations 
of it. From this insight, a FRAM model was created for Arctic ship navigation. This model 
provides a generic map of the connectivity of the processes involved for ship navigation, 
as informed by the interviewees. The model was then used to observe the functionality of 
the Exxon Valdez Grounding case study. This case study represented one variation of 
Arctic ship navigation and it was observed that the functional activity of this case was 
indeed dynamic. The analysis of this case study was the origin of the concept of functional 
signatures that are presented in the subsequent chapters. The insight that functional activity 
seen prior to the Exxon Valdez grounding could be likened to a signature that was left 
behind by that event. It would be interesting to see if other voyages of the Exxon Valdez 
had similar or different functional signatures at other times that it navigated the Valdez 
narrows, but this could not be done. The available data for the Exxon Valdez over its 
lifetime is reflective of the Safety I approach, in that it is focused only on the accident, and 
no information was documented about the many successful voyages through the same 
waterways. 
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Figure 1.16: FRAM model for ship navigation with input from ship navigators 
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Chapter 4 presents the theoretical framework for the PMPM method. Using FRAM as 
described by Hollnagel (2012) allows for process mapping to be done through the creation 
of a FRAM model. The additional concept of functional signatures then enables processes 
to be monitored more thoroughly than with the standard procedures of the FRAM (Figure 
1.17). The active functions at any time (t) are presented in bold red and the specific outputs 
of those functions at time (t) are written on the line coupling that output to its downstream 
function. The functional activity and functional outputs will vary over time, allowing users 
to more closely observe the functional dynamics of an operation. The functional activity 
for the operation can be monitored on a case by case basis. The concept of performance 
measurement is adopted from Ayyub (2014) to add a quantitative element to the FRAM 
that did not exist previously (Figure 1.15). The PMPM method is then demonstrated using 
a hypothetical case of driving a car to work. 
 
Figure 1.17: A functional signature for a given time (t) 
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Chapter 5 focuses on the application of the PMPM method. In this work, data is used from 
an ice management experiment in a ship simulator (Veitch et al., 2018). The application of 
the method helps to strengthen confidence in the practicalities of the method. This work 
also explored the statistics of functional signatures. The methodology can be seen in Figure 
1.18. Additionally, the ship simulator data was acquired from an experiment where ship 
captains and cadets were asked to perform ice management operations using a simulated 
ship environment. The use of this data required approval from the tri-council ethics board 
for secondary use of data. See appendix A for ethics documentation. 
 
Figure 1.18: Flow chart of PMPMM methodology 
 
The aggregate of this work forms the basis of the PMPM method with applications to Arctic 
ship navigation. Figure 1.19 displays the component parts of the method. The method has 
quantitative elements through the performance measurement component. This component 
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helps understand the range of performance that is being achieved by the operation by 
measuring the overall performance of the operation. However, this measurement alone does 
not provide insight as to why higher or lower performance is being achieved. By coupling 
this measurement with functional signatures (process monitoring), there is potential to 
uncover why higher or lower performance is being achieved in any given case. If certain 
functional patterns can be identified as contributors to high or low performance, that insight 
can be used to manage the operation accordingly. 
 
Figure 1.19: Components of PMPMM method for safety management 
1.6. Organization of the thesis 
The thesis is written in manuscript format, including four journal papers as chapters. Table 
1.2 shows the papers written during the course of this research and establishes their 
connection to the overall objectives and associated tasks. 
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Table 1.2: Organization of manuscript thesis 
Paper title Research objective Associated task 
Chapter 2: Understanding 
industrial safety: comparing 
fault trees, Bayesian 
networks, and FRAM 
approaches 
 To understand the 
evolution of safety 
methodologies 
 To improve the 
understanding and 
utility of fault trees, 
Bayesian networks 
and FRAM 
 Review industrial 
safety 
 Comparison of fault 
tree, Bayesian 
network, and 
FRAM using a 
propane feed heater 
system 
 Discussion of the 
outcomes for each 
method 
Chapter 3: Using FRAM to 
understand Arctic ship 
navigation: assessing work 
processes during the Exxon 
Valdez grounding 
 To build a FRAM 
model for Arctic 
ship navigation 
 To illustrate the 
model’s utility by 
examining the 
functionality during 
the Exxon Valdez 
grounding 
 Build a conceptual 
model for Arctic 
ship navigation 
 Discuss 
functionality with 
ship captains to 
improve conceptual 
model 
 Introduce the 
concept of 
functional 
signatures 
 Demonstrate 
functional 
signatures using the 
Exxon Valdez 
grounding 
Chapter 4: Integration of 
resilience and FRAM for 
safety management 
 To integrate 
resilience concepts 
with FRAM for 
safety management 
 Present system 
performance 
measurement as a 
way to quantify 
success/failure 
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 To discuss how the 
method might be 
used to manage 
safety 
 Connect functional 
signatures to system 
performance 
measurement 
Chapter 5: Visualizing and 
understanding the 
operational dynamics of a 
shipping operation 
 To further develop 
functional 
signatures as a 
method to visualize 
operational 
dynamics 
 To present the 
application of this 
semi-quantitative 
method using data 
from an ice 
management 
simulator 
 Present functional 
signatures to show 
the dynamics of the 
operation 
 Demonstrate the 
post-processing of 
data from the ice 
management 
simulator 
experiment 
 Perform data 
analysis using the 
semi-quantitative 
approach 
 Discuss this 
methods relevance 
to safety 
management 
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2. UNDERSTANDING INDUSTRIAL SAFETY: COMPARING 
FAULT TREE, BAYESIAN NETWORK, AND FRAM 
APPROACHES 
2.1. Co-authorship statement 
A version of this manuscript has been accepted for publication in the Journal of loss 
prevention in the process industries, written by authors, Doug Smith, Brian Veitch, Faisal 
Khan, and Rocky Taylor. Author Doug Smith led the writing of this review paper including, 
the literature review, case study and discussion. All authors participated in discussions that 
helped enhance the concepts presented in the discussion section of this paper. All authors 
revised, edited, and made recommendations for improvements to earlier drafts of this paper. 
2.2. Abstract 
Industrial accidents are a major concern for companies and families alike. It is a high 
priority to all stakeholders that steps be taken to prevent accidents from occurring. In this 
paper, three approaches to safety are examined: fault trees (FT), Bayesian networks (BN), 
and the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM). A case study of a propane feed 
control system is used to apply these methods. In order to make safety improvements to 
industrial workplaces high understanding of the systems is required. It is shown that 
consideration of the chance of failure of the system components, as in the FT and BN 
approaches, may not provide enough understanding to fully inform safety assessments. The 
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FT and BN methods are top-down approaches that are formed from the perspective of 
management in workplaces. The FRAM methodology uses a bottom-up approach from the 
operational perspective to improve the understanding of the industrial workplace. The 
FRAM approach can provide added insight to the human factor and context and increase 
the rate at which we learn by considering successes as well as failures. FRAM can be a 
valuable tool for industrial safety assessment and to consider industrial safety holistically, 
by providing a framework to examine the operations in detail. However, operations should 
be considered using both top-down and bottom-up perspectives and all operational 
experience to make the most informed safety decisions.    
2.3. Introduction 
Understanding industrial accidents will always be at the forefront of industrial safety 
assessments. This understanding provides the information necessary to apply accident 
preventative measures to industrial processes. It is unlikely that complete understanding 
will ever be achieved, given the continual evolution of workplaces. With constantly 
evolving technologies and societal values, accident theories must also evolve to reflect the 
current state of knowledge. It is important to understand the evolution of industrial safety 
assessments and how they are influenced by technologies, societal values, and history. 
Societal values are often reflected by the actions of governments and societal leaders. The 
Code of Hammurabi (Circa 1750 B.C.) is one of the earliest extant codes reflecting the laws 
of 18th century BC Mesopotamia. This document describes some 300 laws that should be 
enforced, including “appropriate” punishments for worker malpractice or early industrial 
accidents. The code was largely based on the retribution principle and also prescribes 
44 
 
 
punishment by the societal level of the victim. This type of legislation would be completely 
inadequate in today’s societies, although it provided some sense of accountability against 
negligence.  The code violates today’s standards of human rights, but does reflect what was 
acceptable in one of the most influential civilizations of the time. This effort to shape human 
behavior is cited as an early document that addressed health and safety (Speegle, 2012). 
Societies have evolved a great deal since then, creating industries which in turn brought 
about industrial safety assessments. During the industrial revolution, workplaces started to 
resemble what is seen in today’s industries. Safety was approached at that time by using 
science and engineering to design technologies. Improvements in safety were achieved by 
adapting first principles and technological advancements to existing systems. An early 
example of this is the Railroad Safety Appliance Act of 1893 (Hollnagel, 2014b). This act 
was formed because of public outcry in response to the many casualties of railway work at 
the time (Louisell & Anderson, 1953). The US government implemented the Railroad 
Safety Appliance Act to legislate the use of technological advancements, such as air brakes 
and automatic car couplers, on American railroads. This would reduce the number of 
injuries to, and fatalities of, railway workers by eliminating manual car coupling. This 
combination of technological advancement and societal pressures resulted in one of the 
most significant documents with respect to industrial safety. 
In 1979, the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power plant suffered a partial meltdown. A valve 
that was stuck open in the water cooling system for the secondary core was leaking the 
cooling water. When control room operators noticed warning lights, the possibility of water 
cooling failure was dismissed because normal water pressure was measured upstream of 
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the leak. A series of actions was taken to deescalate the situation, but all failed due to 
improper assessment  (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2013). This accident changed 
the way we understand accidents. Retrospective Analysis uncovered a missing element in 
accident analysis and human factors became an integral part of formal safety assessments 
thereafter. Shortly after, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission published a handbook on 
Human Reliability (Swain & Guttman, 1983).  
In 1986, two accidents occurred that brought attention to another element that was missing 
in safety assessments. On January 28, 1986, the Challenger space shuttle exploded during 
its take off, resulting in the loss of life of the six astronauts and one school teacher onboard. 
While there is consensus that the explosion resulted from an O-ring failure, the subsequent 
investigation would reveal many questions about the understanding of the risks by the 
shuttle’s management team (Feynman, 1999). On April 26, 1986, the explosion of reactor 
4 at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant devastated the area with effects that are still being 
felt today. Again this accident brought attention to the human factor, but also to the 
organization’s role in human reliability assessments (Meshkati, 1991). It was seen from 
these accidents that organizations can shape human behavior, and their role has since been 
considered in formal safety assessments. 
History, technology and societal values have shaped our current understanding of industrial 
accidents. Modern safety assessments require consideration of technological, human and 
organizational factors, which represent the so-called, socio-technological system. This 
evolution of safety assessments is a direct result of learning from past accidents in evolving 
industries and societies. As we learn from accidents retroactively, there is lag between the 
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rates at which industries evolve and safety assessments evolve: Is there a way to reduce this 
lag time and perform safety assessments that are more representative of the current states 
of the industries? In this paper, we compare how modern accident analysis techniques 
process information of industrial workplaces, using a propane feed control system as an 
example, and examine how that relates to the current understanding of accident processes 
and industrial operations. 
2.4. Background 
Much as safety policy has evolved, so too has the background knowledge that influence 
safety methodologies. This has been described in terms of the ages of safety, respectively: 
The age of technology, the age of human factors, and the age of safety management (Hale 
& Hovden, 1998). Each age is characterized by the consideration of a new class of factors 
that are revealed as important as past accidents are studied. The age of technology refers to 
safety assessments that are approached by consideration of technical factors. The age of the 
human factor refers to the adoption of the human element in safety assessments. The age 
of safety management refers to incorporation of organizational factors and understanding 
how organizations can shape human behavior. It has been stated that there has been another 
age of safety since, the age of integration (Glendon et al., 2006). This age is defined by the 
integration of the previous three ages into more holistic accident models. There is now a 
movement to bring about a new age of safety, the adaptive age (Borys et al., 2009). This 
age refers to the use of systemic accident theories to produce adaptive safety systems. The 
current age of safety is somewhere between the age of integration and the adaptive age, 
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with practitioners lagging behind researchers and academics (Underwood & Waterson, 
2013). 
The age of integration is a natural progression of the past principles that have been adopted 
from risk analysis and reliability engineering. Reliability engineering built a framework 
that has been quite successful in describing and understanding technical factors. Failure 
rates of technical components are used to form reliability assessments, and causal 
relationships are studied for said technologies. The failure rates can then be translated to 
failure probabilities and used in risk assessments and cost-benefit analysis. This 
methodology extended into the age of human factors and age of safety management. This 
produced human reliability assessments. Methods such as THERP (Swain, 1963), 
ATHEANA (Cooper et al., 1996), CREAM (Hollnagel, 1998) and HEPI (Khan, Amyotte, 
& DiMattia, 2006) have been developed to predict human error. Predicting human failure 
probabilities allowed the human element to be adopted in the risk framework. There is more 
to consider when examining accidents than technical, human and organizational factors. 
There are also extreme weather events, political situations, harsh environments, and 
unexpected deviations from normal operations. These are external factors that cannot be 
controlled by the stakeholders of the operation, although they must be managed. This has 
led to the use of Bayesian Networks as a tool to incorporate these complexly interrelated 
factors into probabilistic models that are updatable and allow the accident risk to be 
quantified. 
The adaptive age of safety, while still building on the information from past ages, requires 
a shift in the way we view accidents. Accidents are not viewed as resultant of direct causes, 
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but rather as emergent from system variability or from gaps in system control. This is an 
important distinction because many of the system components that are labeled causes are 
also present during successful operations. Appropriate actions can be easy to prescribe after 
the outcome is known, but outcomes are not known in advance. When considering the 
human factor, emergent accident theories are appropriate because actions cannot be 
prescribed for all possible conditions found in modern workplaces. This perspective leads 
to the realization that accident scenarios are not completely preventable and predictable, 
which makes sense given the continual evolution of industrial workplaces. In the adaptive 
age, focus is placed on designing safety systems that are adaptable and resilient against 
emergent accident scenarios.  
To examine the difference between the integrative and adaptive age, the following section 
will examine the case of a propane feed control system. The safety of the system will be 
examined first by probabilistic approaches: Fault Tree (FT) and Bayesian Network (BN). 
The system safety will then be examined using an adaptive accident model, the Functional 
Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM). 
 
2.4.1. FRAM 
FRAM is a systemic accident analysis method that is developed from the fundamentals of 
resilience engineering (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006). Resilience engineering is the 
study of why systems or objects work in the face of adversity, and also how to achieve 
robust and flexible designs that will work even when faced with unfavorable conditions. 
As socio-technological systems are often under-specified, lack comprehensive 
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understanding, and contain inherent performance variations, it is then appropriate to use 
such a systemic approach. FRAM can be used to achieve safety and understand how the 
system may be able to maintain a safe state even when subjected to dynamic operational 
conditions. 
FRAM is based on four underlying principles (Hollnagel, 2012): 
 Failures and successes are equivalent in the way that they happen for the 
same reason. Alternatively, it can be said that things go wrong for the same 
reasons that they go right. 
 Daily performance of socio-technical systems, including humans 
individually and collectively, is always adjusted to match the system 
conditions. 
 Many of the outcomes of the system that we notice, and also the ones we 
don’t notice, are emergent rather than resultant. 
 Relations and dependencies must be described as they develop in a 
particular situation and not as cause-effect links. This is done through 
functional resonance. 
 
Traditional safety analysis methods have focused on failures and treated them as a cause 
and effect relationship. The cause is often viewed as a deviation from a prescribed 
procedure. It is impossible to prescribe procedures that are adequate for all conditions in a 
dynamic system. Adjustment or deviations are necessary for successes as well. The 
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adaptive interaction between humans and technology is essential to operations, and labels 
such as successes and failures can only be determined after the outcomes are known. 
If it is accepted that successes and failures happen for the same reason, then the outcomes 
are emergent and not resultant. The outcome emerges from variations in the functions of 
the system and outcomes might only be noticed when the variable system performance rises 
above the detection threshold. The variable system performance can be thought of as a 
combination of weak signals that interact in such a way that may produce an amplified 
performance variability for the overall system. This concept is similar to stochastic 
resonance, where random noise is added to a weak signal and the interaction will result in 
resonance and the previously undetectable weak signal will then be detectable (Hollnagel, 
2012). In a socio-technological system, the noise is not random but rather the mixed signals 
from the other interacting system functions. The combined interaction of variable 
functional outputs from the individual system function can produce functional resonance. 
The result will be a noticeable variation in overall system performance. 
FRAM is a novel method for assessment of safety using a holistic approach. The method 
describes the functions (what you do) that are necessary to make a system operate. The 
functions have 6 parameters that couple the system function (Figure 2.1). It addresses ways 
of coping with the complexities of socio-technological systems in an easily understandable 
way. 
There are 4 steps to conducting a FRAM analysis (Hollnagel, 2012). The first step is to 
identify and describe the functions necessary for work to succeed. The second step is to 
characterize the variability of the functions from step 1. The third step is to assess how the 
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variability of each function affects the variability of the system as a whole. The fourth step 
is to identify ways to manage the possible uncontrolled performance variability. 
Identifying the functions includes a detailed breakdown of the functions or activities 
required for work to happen. This should be based on “work as done” instead of “work as 
imagined” or work as planned. In the case of risk assessment, it is impossible to know how 
work is done if it hasn’t happened yet, so it should be based on how work is likely done. 
The function should be described in terms of the 6 parameters displayed in Figure 2.1: 
inputs, preconditions, time, resources, controls and outputs. Inputs are items that are 
processed, transformed or needed to start the function. The output is the result of the 
function, which can be an entity or change of state. Preconditions are conditions that must 
exist before the function can be executed. Resources are consumed during the function to 
produce the output. Time is the temporal constraints on the function, with respect to the 
starting time, finishing time or duration. The control identifies ways that the function is 
monitored or controlled. 
 
Figure 2.1: FRAM function diagram 
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The functions then may be coupled if the descriptions of the parameters are common for 
two or more functions. For example, if function A has an output that is an input or 
precondition for function B, then there would be coupling between function A and B. The 
coupling can be represented graphically by connections of one or more of the parameters 
from each function. 
The variability then needs to be assessed for each function. The variability of the output of 
the function is what should be assessed, rather than the variability of the function itself. The 
variability of the output can be a result of the function variability (step 2), the working 
environment variability (step 2) or variability from coupled functions (step 3). The 
functions should first be characterized into one of three categories: technical functions, 
human functions or organizational functions. The variability can then be assessed by one 
of two methods: a simple method or a more elaborate method. The simple method only 
provides assessment of the variability in the function output in terms of time and precision. 
The elaborate method considers four categories for the output variability: 1) timing and 
duration; 2) force, distance and direction; 3) object; and 4) sequence. Then the variability 
due to function coupling should be assessed  (Hollnagel, 2012). 
If the analysis indicates uncontrolled performance variability - functional resonance - 
methods should be determined to manage the variability. Solutions should be sought to 
dampen the variability, or to control the performance variability if the outcome is expected 
to be beneficial. This can be done by adjusting the function parameters to produce a more 
consistent output. Due to the inherent variability in processes and their interactions, 
adjustments must be made to everyday work to maintain a functioning workplace. By 
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understanding the system variability and identifying how to control it, safety can be 
achieved. 
2.5. Case Study 
A propane feed system was examined using FT and BN modelling from Khakzad et al. 
(2011). The probabilistic modeling will be referred to as it is seen in that work. The propane 
feed control system consists of an automatic control system that is the primary or desired 
control system. In the event that the automatic system is unavailable, or not functioning 
properly, a manual control system can be used to maintain the propane feed control. These 
models describe the components of the system and predict the probability of improper 
control of the propane feed system. In the FT analysis (Table 2.1 and Figure 2.2), the basic 
component failure probabilities are given and the system failure probability is computed by 
logical “and/or” operators for the faults. The BN (Figure 2.3) uses conditional probability 
tables to relate the individual component failure probabilities to overall system failure 
probability. Generalized system failure probabilities are then computed for a propane feed 
control system with automatic and manual control systems. 
Table 2.1: System components of propane feed control system (Khakzad, Khan, & Amyotte, 2011) 
Component Symbol Probability 
Pressure transmitter failure PT 0.1647 
Pressure controller failure PC 0.2818 
No signal received by pressure controller PC_signal OR-gate 
Pressure relay failure PY 0.1538 
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No signal received by actuator Act_signal OR-gate 
Automatic valve mechanical failure A_valve 0.3403 
Actuator mechanical failure Actuator 0.2015 
Automatic valve improper control A_valve_ctrl OR-gate 
Human failure in operating manual valve Hum_err 0.2696 
Manual valve mechanical failure M_valve 0.1393 
Manual valve improper control M_valve_ctrl OR-gate 
Feed system improper control Feed_ctrl AND-gate 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Fault tree of propane feed control system (Khakzad et al., 2011) 
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Figure 2.3: Bayesian network of propane feed control system with an alarm added (Khakzad et al., 
2011) 
In generalized safety models, the context of the application is usually neglected or not 
considered to the extent that it should be. If we take the failure of the pressure controller to 
be 0.2818, as indicated in Table 2.1, is this true for all propane feed control systems? If the 
pressure controllers are purchased from different manufacturers, or a higher quality product 
is chosen, would that affect the component reliability? If the pressure controller is misused, 
or is poorly maintained, would that affect the component reliability? The probability of 
0.2818 is a generalized value which is estimated from the failure data of many pressure 
controllers irrespective of the context. Some of the pressure controllers in this data set might 
not have been used in propane feed systems, but completely different systems. 
Context becomes even more relevant when considering human behavior and decision 
making. The propane feed control system is designed such that if there is a failure of a 
technical component in the automatic feed system, the manual feed system will be engaged 
by a worker to maintain the system control. All the human elements in this system are 
described by a single node called “human error.” What is the context of this human error? 
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Is it just that humans make an error 26.96 % of the time (Table 2.1)? It is not completely 
clear what is meant by human error in this context and it provides little guidance to improve 
the human reliability. 
Another method that can be used to examine this system is the Functional Resonance 
Analysis Method (FRAM). By doing this, an additional and more informed understanding 
of the system can be gained. Rather than describing the system by its components, FRAM 
describes the system in terms of the functions that the components carry out. The system is 
broken down into the functions that are carried out by technology, humans and 
organizations. The technical components of the propane feed system can carry out all the 
functions necessary to operate the control system. The manual control system monitors the 
automatic control system and relies on an operator to adjust the propane flow in the event 
that the automatic system cannot control it. See Figure 2.4 for FRAM representation of the 
propane feed control system and Appendix B for the description of the functions and 
coupling. 
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Figure 2.4: FRAM model of propane feed control system 
The next step in FRAM modelling is to assess the function variability. The variability of 
the function outputs should be examined with respect to time and precision. The output 
may be produced on time, too early, too late, or not at all with respect to time. The output 
may also be precise, acceptable or imprecise with respect to precision. A change in the 
output variability could produce variability in the overall system performance, but not 
necessarily system failure. When considering the potential variability, it is possible that the 
output could potentially be either of the states listed with respect to time and precision. The 
function variability requires context to assess fully. Examining a case or set of cases will 
provide insight to the adjustments that need to be made regularly within a system due to 
variability in the outputs. Even though this generalized propane feed control model lacks 
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specific context, the potential functional resonance (significant performance variability) 
can be assessed at some level of detail. 
To illustrate, we consider that the automatic control system is composed of a series of 
technical components, and at some point at least one of the essential components will fail. 
In order to maintain functionality of the system, the manual control system must be engaged 
to control the flow. This requires that the operator is aware of the automatic system failure 
in time to make corrective action. This makes monitoring the automatic control system 
crucial to maintaining the propane flow control. One potential instance of improper propane 
control is if the pressure sensor fails in the automatic system this could also affect the ability 
to monitor the system. If the pressure sensor is the signal that alerts the worker that the 
automatic system has malfunctioned, failure of that component could disable both the 
automatic and manual systems. It is not exactly stated which components in the automatic 
system are monitored to indicate the automatic system performance to the worker. 
However, it can significantly affect the system reliability and system performance. A 
solution to this is to add another pressure sensor to indicate the system pressure to the alarm 
and notify the worker and also provide direct feedback to the worker for monitoring 
purposes (Figure 2.5). With this modification, the failure of a single component does not 
affect both the automatic and manual feed control systems. Another important question that 
is evident when assessing this system is: where is the sensor located within the system? Is 
it in the best place to correctly signal over-pressure situations to the alarm? Or is more 
monitoring required? Describing the work in terms of the functions and the system 
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variability helps to identify situations where the component may not have failed but it failed 
to complete its task due to poor system design.   
 
Figure 2.5: FRAM model of propane feed control system with design adjustment 
We can transfer the modified system back to the fault tree representation, as shown in 
Figure 2.6. The human error component which was previously a primary event, has been 
converted to an intermediate event. This requires that probability of human error is now 
computed by the logical operators connecting the primary events of alarm failure, PA, and 
the additional pressure sensor, PT2. This representation of the system yields a probability 
of improper feed control of 0.1418. This assumes that the probability of alarm failure is 
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0.2614, and the probability of failure of PT2 is equal to PT (Khakzad et al., 2011). There 
is also an assumption that a human error will occur as a result of the failure of both the 
alarm system and the secondary pressure sensor. It could be that a human error will occur 
with the failure of the alarm system or the secondary pressure sensor, or a human error may 
occur that is not related to either of the two events. These scenarios would require additional 
fault trees to be developed compute the other possible probabilities of improper propane 
feed control, making this modelling technique quite cumbersome. 
 
Figure 2.6: Updated fault tree with alarm and extra sensor 
 
Now consider this system as represented by a Bayesian Network (Figure 2.7). The Bayesian 
Network is a more robust modelling technique than the Fault Tree. It can accommodate 
more direct and complex dependencies between factors. Using the conditional probability 
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tables, more complex relationships can be modelled than with logical operators. The 
Bayesian Network can also incorporate higher order factors, where as a fault tree can only 
consider binary. These benefits of the Bayesian network are seen when modeling the alarm 
and the human error factors. The Alarm has 3 states: No sound, Wrong sound, and Right 
sound. The alarm and human error are also conditioned such that relationships do not 
strictly adhere to the logical operations seen in the fault tree (Khakzad et al., 2011). This 
analysis in Figure 2.7 yielded a probability of improper feed control of 0.1042. 
 
Figure 2.7: Updated Bayesian Network with extra sensor 
There are other ways the system could fail to function even with the system as depicted in 
Figure 2.5: Both pressure sensors could fail, both valves could fail, the worker may not be 
present at the time of automatic system failure, or the worker may be distracted by other 
tasks which affects his ability to monitor the system. Depending on the consequences and 
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context of the situation, it may be appropriate to add a pressure rupture disk, or a safety 
system that requires a worker to be present for the system to operate at all. In this analysis, 
organizational factors were not considered as it would depend on the context of which 
regulations apply and which companies are the acting operators. The organizational factors 
can be considered in FRAM by including the functions that those organizational entities 
carry out. 
2.6. Discussion 
Three modern techniques were used to assess the safety of a propane feed control system. 
One main difference between the techniques is the treatment of the human factor, and 
organizational factor, although the focus here has been on the human factor. The fault tree 
uses discrete logical operators and assumes that all factors are binary. There are methods 
to adopt fuzzy logic to fault trees, but this requires that distributions are known to model 
the factor dependencies. This is often unknown for the human element and given that work 
is often under-specified, there are times it cannot be known. The Bayesian network 
approach is an improvement on the fault tree approach. It can better model complex factor 
dependencies using conditional probability tables, however it encounters similar issues as 
the fault tree approach using fuzzy logic given that all the conditions may not be known. 
The Bayesian network allows for factors that are higher order than binary, as seen with the 
alarm. The FRAM approach provides a framework that allows the human interaction in the 
system to be more easily understood, by describing the work. The human element is 
essential to successful operations and needs to be considered as more than a component 
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that can only succeed or fail. FRAM can better describe complex human-technological 
interactions within a system and then more informed safety solutions can be identified. 
It should be noted that the FRAM analysis was only partially completed in this case study. 
Step 1, the functional description of the system was completed and only one instance of 
variability was considered, a pressure sensor failure. It is not practical to hypothesize about 
the range of normal variability that could be seen during the operation of a propane feed 
control system. In practice, information about variability should come from the workers 
who perform the work to represent the actual variability and not the imagined variability. 
In this case, the propane feed system is a hypothetical system, referring to any propane feed 
system that contains the same components. Therefore, the analysis was truncated after this 
one instance of variability as there were no workers to verify imagined variability claims. 
This level of analysis was also sufficient to illustrate the building of the FRAM system and 
the perspective that is gained from using FRAM. 
In section 2.5 a modification was made to the original safety analysis (Khakzad et al., 2011) 
based on the insights identified using the FRAM analysis. An improvement from 0.2720 to 
0.1418 was made in terms of the estimated probability of improper propane feed control as 
modeled using the fault tree approach. A slight improvement was observed when the 
modified system was analyzed using the Bayesian network approach, from 0.1146 to 
0.1042. However, there was no data to update the conditional probability tables for this 
updated system, so the results were unlikely to change significantly. When new system 
conditions are identified or proposed, the previous data may become irrelevant if it was 
collected under different conditions, which is a drawback of probabilistic techniques. 
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FRAM is a technique that can be used to understand new systems in terms of why they may 
fail and also why they should work. Given that industrial workplaces are constantly 
evolving, it is important to assess new (present) systems without invoking biases from older 
systems. This adaptable approach provides balanced consideration of the factors present in 
socio-technical systems and has the ability to assess new and evolving conditions in 
industrial safety. By considering this alternative perspective in FRAM additional 
information can be revealed which can help inform safety assessments. This bottom-up 
approach can complement the top-down approaches of the FT and BN if they are needed. 
2.6.1. Human Factor 
When studying industrial accidents, it becomes evident that humans have played a major 
role in past accidents. Many quotes can be found in the literature referencing the high 
percentage of accidents that are caused or contributed to by human error, regardless of 
industry. 
“…Somewhere between 70-80% of all aviation accident are attributed, at least in part, to 
human error…” (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2004) 
“…About 80 percent of all events are attributed to human error. In some industries, this 
number is closer to 90 percent…” (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), 2009) 
“…About 75-96% of marine casualties are caused, at least in part, by some form of human 
error…” (Rothblum, 2000) 
Given the high percentage of accidents that are being attributed to human error, it is 
important that careful consideration is given to how the human element is incorporated into 
modern safety assessments. In socio-technical systems, humans do not function in the same 
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way that a technical component does. Humans are necessary in industrial workplaces to 
adapt to unexpected events and maintain functionality. The expectation is that humans act 
on the many conditions that may be present in the workplace, some of which do not have 
prescribed solutions. Then success or failure may be assigned to human actions by the 
determination of how favorable or unfavorable an outcome is. FRAM uses a structured 
framework to understand how human actions effect the success and failures of industrial 
operations. To improve the understanding of the human factor more, information about the 
work and variability should be collected from the operators to understand how work 
actually happens. However, this is not done in this analysis. 
2.6.2. Emergence 
Given the level of detail that has been presented in this comparison the FRAM analysis 
may appear to be less complete than the BN and FT analysis. The FT and BN analysis 
produces quantifiable results that estimate the chance of system failure occurring. This 
quantification gives closure to the analysis, but does it provide enough insight to make 
suggestions to adequately improve the safety? The probabilities are difficult to verify in 
complex socio-technical systems. The structure of the FT and BN models are developed 
from a prior understanding of the operations. This structure then allows the probabilities to 
be estimated by searching for the data that is deemed important by your prior 
understanding. Then probabilities reflect your prior belief of the influence that certain 
system components have on causing accidents. Of course the BN approach does give the 
ability to update the probabilities with new data but data will only be collected for the 
components that are believed to be important. Given the evolving nature of industrial 
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workplaces complete understanding will be difficult to achieve, but additional information 
can be obtained, which will strengthen the understanding. 
In the FRAM approach, the insight that is provided in Section 3 is that accidents do not 
result directly from the existence of certain components in a system. In fact, the presence 
of these components make the system likely to succeed most often. The understanding of 
the accident is contained within the interactions of the system components. In FRAM, the 
interaction is examined through the variability of the system outputs from the functions and 
the coupling with downstream functions. At the level of detail of these analyses (constant 
for FT, BN and FRAM), the variability is not sufficiently defined. To understand the 
variability of the system more details are required. As the level of detail is increased and 
understood the actual causes of the accidents will start to emerge. This property of emergent 
accident theories can improve our understanding as we are forced to seek more details to 
achieve higher understanding of events 
2.6.3. Functional Resonance 
In section 2.4.1 functional resonance is likened to stochastic resonance. In stochastic 
resonance, many (weak) signals of random noise can be combined to form a system of 
noisy signals. When the signals combine, occasionally there will be “resonant spikes” in 
the overall system signal that appear much larger in magnitude than the weaker noisy 
signals that have been inputted. This resonance is a function of random frequency and weak 
(yet variable) amplitude noise. For functional resonance, the signals are not random. They 
are the variable outputs of the system functions, also in some cases the variability may be 
hard to define continuously (unlike stochastic noise). The functional output with no 
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variably is to produce the output exactly in terms of precision and the time it is required to 
be produced. Such exact outputs are rarely achievable in practice and it would be poor 
design to require such exactness. The functional output can also be some lower precision, 
roughly timed variation of the idealized (imagined) output. The output can vary to the point 
where there is no output produced – a functional failure. A functional failure alone does 
not necessarily indicate resonance, as most systems are resilient enough to accommodate 
localized failure with minimal effect on the overall system performance. I.e. a failure of a 
single component in the automatic propane feed control system will likely not affect the 
performance of the entire system because the manual system will be activated and propane 
flow will be regulated manually achieving good performance for the system.  However, 
resonance can occur when the variability of a single function combines with other functions 
to produce a significantly different effect on the overall system. I.e. when we consider a 
potential pressure sensor failure, it has the potential to effect the performance of the alarm 
system (if that pressure sensor is also used in the alarm system), which would also effect 
the chance that the worker notices the improper pressure situation, increasing the chance of 
improper propane control in both the automatic and manual systems – functional resonance. 
In the manuscript, a second pressure sensor was added to the alarm system to minimize the 
chance of this resonance scenario. 
2.6.4. Failure vs. Success 
In the FT and BN approaches a premium is placed on examining details of the accidents 
(failures) which does make sense, but the successes are often ignored and considered less 
valuable. In fact, there is a lot of information that can be learned from the successes, some 
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of which may be critical to accident prevention. Successes are examined in FRAM by 
understanding the functions that are necessary for work to succeed. The quantification of 
the FT and BN should be representative of both successes and failures. Given that the 
probability of failure is the ratio of failures to the sum of successes and failures, it should 
require that the successes be considered as well. To better understand industrial safety, the 
details of the successes should be examined and not just the number of successes. If we are 
to study safety we should examine the cases where safety is actually present (successes) 
and by studying the accidents we are studying the absence of safety (Hollnagel, 2014b). 
Actually, both successes and failures should be examined extensively to better understand 
safety and accidents and improve industrial safety assessments. 
Approaching safety by understanding the successes and prescribing strategies to have 
future success may be more effective (or at least more comprehensive) than prescribing 
strategies to not fail. If we consider that operational success is defined by achieving one or 
more goals that may be prescribed by the operation. In practice, the goals are not always 
achieved by the idealized definitions but by achieving them within some acceptable 
tolerance. Once the acceptable limits are exceeded, the operation will be labeled a failure. 
By this definition, prescribing strategies to succeed becomes a bounded problem whereas 
prescribing strategies to not fail is unbounded. This is a technique that has been proposed 
by others in the past as a proactive risk management strategy (Rasmussen and Svedung, 
2000). Such a strategy is well suited for FRAM as well. Figure 2.8 displays this definition 
for operational success and failure. In FRAM each function requires some objective to be 
completed – and output to be produced which has some idealized expectation of the output. 
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Each function can represent an axis with a variable scale. When the function produces the 
exact imagined output, that point would be located at the origin. Once we notice imprecise 
variations of the output occurring the point on that axis starts to move away from the origin 
based on the deviation from the expected value. By doing this for each function in the 
system we can define the state of variability at a given time. Then it is important to 
understand the amount and type of variability that the system can accommodate 
(resilience). This defines the acceptable limits of the operation. If the state of variability is 
completely inside of the acceptable operational limits, conditions would be met to define 
success. Once the variability starts to exceed the acceptable limits, conditions would define 
failure. Additionally, it may be difficult to exactly define what the limits of the operation 
are, so there will be a so called grey area or blunt boundary.  
 
Figure 2.8: Defining operational success vs. operational failure 
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Learning from the successes also improves the rate at which we can learn. The rate at which 
successes occur is much higher than the rate at which failures occur. And if we consider 
both we are constantly learning. Practically, if we are to examine the failures extensively, 
we are not only limited to the rate at which accidents occur we are limited to the rate at 
which accidents are reported. Consider the ratio of accident cases categorized by decreasing 
severity respectively, accident, incident, and near miss, as in Heinrich’s triangle (Heinrich, 
1931). While the proportions of these accident cases may or may not resemble the triangle 
distribution proposed by Heinrich, it can be used to illustrate another feature of FRAM. We 
may consider that accidents and incidents are typically reported because the severity of the 
outcome is noticeable. The number of near misses may not be accurately reported because 
the near miss does not produce an outcome that is noticeably different from a success 
(Figure 2.9). Some proportion of these near misses will not be noticed in a methodology 
that focuses on unfavorable outcomes. In Figure 2.9 the shape and relative sizes of these 
events are chosen arbitrarily, and is just for illustrative purposes. The near misses that 
would otherwise be unnoticed can be found in the FRAM approach through variability for 
a successful outcome. Variations within the system which required adjustments to be made 
to maintain the system functionality represent the normal system variability including many 
near misses.    
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Figure 2.9: Accident triangle visualization of unreported near misses 
2.6.5. Method Comparison 
While using this case study as a comparison of three modern assessment methods it may 
be useful to compare the methods directly as seen in Table 2.2. It may not stand out that 
there is one method better than the other. Each method can be useful and can be used as a 
tool to help inform safety assessors. They are different methods that help us understand 
different things and the most appropriate approach would be to use the information 
uncovered by each synergistically.   
Table 2.2: Comparison of the methods 
 
Amount of 
information 
required 
Type of 
information 
required 
Accident 
explanation 
Focus of 
investigation 
Guided 
system 
description 
Quantifiable 
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Fault Tree lowest 
components, 
logical 
relationships 
and 
individual 
failure data 
Causal Failure No Yes 
Bayesian 
Network 
more 
components 
and CPT's 
Causal Failure No Yes 
FRAM most 
Functions, 
functional 
interactions 
and 
variability 
Emergent 
Failure and 
success 
Yes No 
The FRAM can at times appear less complete, as it did in this case study but that that is 
because it requires more information to fulfill the analysis. This is not necessarily a down 
fall of the method because by trying to understand the extra information, in terms of 
functionality and understanding the successes, we asked, how is the alarm system being 
actuated? This was shown in the case study to be an important element to consider. The use 
of emergent accident explanations can discourage the acceptance of weaker explanations 
for accidents. While the BN and FT look to explain events using causal chains, what they 
often produce are chains of probably cause. By seeking stronger explanations and making 
them emerge from better understanding, important information can be uncovered to 
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strengthen causal chains. Also, Quantification can be good as long as it is being informed 
appropriately. But, misinformed quantification can be quite dangerous as it implies that an 
analysis has been conducted and all the necessary information has been reduced to a single 
(or interval) quantifiable result. This was seen in the Challenger space shuttle disaster. The 
management team decided to believe that the chances of rocket booster failure when 
launching at the cold temperature that morning was roughly 1 in 1000000 (misinformed 
quantification). When it was revealed later that engineers told management that the chances 
were more likely to be 1 in 1000 (more informed). And the result of this accident was 
partially (if not directly) influenced by misinformed quantification (Feynman, 1999). Also, 
in terms of the guidance provided to understand the system FRAM helps the investigation 
by telling the assessor what to look for. The FT and BN are merely vehicles to support 
quantification and require all qualitative understanding of the system to be tackled with 
little guidance. 
2.7. Conclusions 
The continual evolution of socio-technical systems requires safety assessments to evolve 
to stay relevant. From a case study of a propane feed control system using modern accident 
analysis methods, it can be seen that adaptive methods such as FRAM can be adopted to 
highlight system vulnerabilities that may be present. This method is not limited to learning 
from past failure; there can also be learning from successful operations. In many industries, 
operational limits are being pushed as technologies evolve. This invokes new conditions 
that may have high uncertainties in the system. Given that there may be little known about 
these new conditions, adaptive approaches may be used to suggest safety solutions. 
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The comparison of the three techniques highlights some of their strengths and weaknesses. 
FT and BN analyses of a propane feed control system from Khakzad et al. (2011) was used 
as a reference case. The FRAM method was used to identify some potential vulnerabilities 
in the propane feed control system, then these new systems were modelled using the fault 
tree and Bayesian network approaches. It was also identified that context is important when 
considering system safety. Context is gained through the incorporation of the details that 
are necessary to provide understanding of the operations in FRAM. There could be propane 
feed control systems that are both low risk and high risk that contain the same components. 
How the components are used, connected, and managed can influence the safety assessment 
and the operations. Adaptive approaches make this more evident and allow the context to 
be considered in more detail. This can become even more important when considering 
larger systems, such as an entire propane plant or a sector of the transportation industry.    
FRAM provides a framework that makes complex human-technical relationships easier to 
identify. Identifying these complex relationships is essential to understanding how accident 
scenarios emerge. Proper monitoring strategies and resilient design solutions may then be 
offered to improve system safety. FRAM provides an alternative perspective to safe 
operations that can improve understanding which is the basis of any safety assessment. To 
perform the most comprehensive safety assessments, knowledge of both the operational 
successes and failures are needed. 
While there is value that can be gained from using any of the methods discussed in this 
paper. It is more important that the assessors be cognizant of the utility of each method. 
Each method may help uncover various pieces of the puzzle that is to understand industrial 
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safety. The challenge we are faced with is to keep up with the evolving nature and 
increasing complexity of modern industries. FT and BN are currently staples in the risk 
community but will likely have trouble keeping pace with industries and staying relevant. 
It may also be desirable to adopt FRAM in the toolbox of safety assessors. Synergistically, 
FRAM can be used to help keep up, by learning from successes, helping to monitor 
operations (including unreported near misses), and seeking stronger explanations for 
accidents. This can improve the overall understanding of the system and in turn strengthen 
any quantifiable analysis that is desired.  
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3. USING THE FRAM TO UNDERSTAND ARCTIC SHIP 
NAVIGATION: ASSESSING WORK PROCESSES DURING THE 
EXXON VALDEZ GROUNDING 
3.1. Co-authorship statement 
A version of this manuscript has been published in the International Journal on Marine 
Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation (TRANSNAV), written by authors, Doug 
Smith, Brian Veitch, Faisal Khan, and Rocky Taylor. Author Doug Smith led the writing 
of this manuscript, including development of the methodology, performing interviews with 
ship navigators, building the FRAM model for ship navigation, capturing the variability for 
the FRAM model, and producing the model case study using the Exxon Valdez grounding. 
All authors revised, edited, discussed this work and made recommendations for 
improvements to its presentation. 
3.2. Abstract 
Arctic shipping involves a complex combination of inter-related factors that need to be 
managed correctly for operations to succeed. In this paper, the Functional Resonance 
Analysis Method (FRAM) is used to assess the combination of human, technical, and 
organizational factors that constitute a shipping operation. A methodology is presented on 
how to apply the FRAM to a domain, with a focus on ship navigation. The method draws 
on ship navigators to inform the building of the model and to learn about practical variations 
that must be managed to effectively navigate a ship. The Exxon Valdez case is used to 
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illustrate the model’s utility and provide some context to the information gathered by this 
investigation. The functional signature of the work processes of the Exxon Valdez on the 
night of the grounding is presented. This shows the functional dynamics of that particular 
ship navigation case, and serves to illustrate how the FRAM approach can provide another 
perspective on the safety of complex operations. 
3.3. Introduction 
The Arctic may become integral part of the shipping industry on a global scale if current 
climate trends continue. If that does happen it will involve a transitional period, where 
many lessons will be learned as the boundaries of normal shipping operations are 
broadened. Experienced shipping in the Arctic is limited, information is scarce, and not 
widely shared. In order to become prepared for such an increase in shipping traffic in the 
Arctic (and Antarctic), information we do have should be examined as thoroughly as 
possible. This may help us better understand the conditions and how to operate in them. 
The present work uses the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) to build an 
understanding of Arctic ship navigation and uses the Exxon Valdez grounding as a case to 
examine the model’s utility. This work is intended to initiate discussion across the maritime 
domain about FRAM and understanding Arctic operations. We can use the FRAM to help 
understand different elements of ship navigation, including the so called “soft factors,” 
which are difficult to assess with traditional techniques. This will become even more 
important when considering Arctic shipping because the information is both vague and 
scarce (Arctic Council, 2009). The FRAM provides a structured framework to consider 
anecdotal experience from successful shipping operations, which can help formalize 
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lessons learned and share them across the domain. By consolidating information across the 
domain it will improve our understanding of shipping safety. By improving our 
understanding this way, we can then improve ship operations (the way they function) and 
safety in the maritime domain. 
 
3.4. Background 
A shipping operation is a socio-technical system that requires many combinations of social 
and technical factors to be managed to succeed. There has been a movement towards 
adaptive approaches to safety to help manage such systems (Borys et al., 2009). This 
approach relies on not only modeling the elements in the system, but the relationships in 
the system, eg. how elements interact together (Vicente, 2004). Because of this shift in 
thinking, other techniques are being adopted from resilience engineering to help manage 
complex systems as well (Ayyub, 2014, 2015; Hollnagel et al., 2006).   
Additionally, there is acceptance that many of the conditions that operations are being 
subjected to are so dynamic that it is very difficult to prescribe a single safety protocol to 
manage them. The Society of Risk Analyst’s recent review states that in these cases it is 
better to have a dynamic set of solutions to adapt to these dynamic conditions (Aven et al., 
2015). Safety is then approached by understanding how to best monitor areas of the system 
and how to control them: in other words, by designing systems that adapt (or maintain 
control) when subjected to dynamic conditions. 
There are a number of methods that are founded on adaptive safety methodologies: the 
Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM), Systems-Technical Accident Model and 
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Processes (STAMP), and Human-Tech approach (Hollnagel, 2012; Leveson, 2004; 
Vicente, 2004, respectively). Each method has the potential to improve safety by 
incorporating systems thinking into the approach. In this paper the FRAM is used to 
perform an investigation of ship navigation in the Arctic. The FRAM was chosen for two 
reasons: 1) it focuses on functionality, and 2) it promotes communication between assessors 
and workers. To understand functionality, you must understand the conditions that can be 
operated in, and the conditions that cause problems. This means that accident events should 
not be isolated from the typical operational outcomes to develop understanding of accident 
mechanisms. By isolating the accidents, biases may enter the interpretations of events. 
Safety solutions should show consideration of both the event(s) one would like to prevent 
and promotion of the event(s) one would like to achieve. When understanding functionality, 
it is best to obtain an understanding from the operational perspective. This concept 
promotes understanding the work as it is done, rather than as it is imagined by assessors. 
This can help reduce the communication gap that exists between assessors and operators, 
thereby, promoting safety solutions that are grounded in reality.  
3.4.1. FRAM 
The FRAM is built on identifying functional resonance. Functional resonance is an analogy 
to stochastic resonance, where multiple signals of low amplitude noise are inputted to a 
system and, if resonance occurs, the overall system signal can have a much greater 
amplitude. In functional resonance, the output of the system functions are variable and 
slight variations between the many functions in a system have the potential to combine in 
such a way that resonance occurs. The resonance will be some variation of the overall 
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system performance that goes beyond what is typical or expected, regardless of whether 
the outcome is viewed as good or bad. By modeling the system functions and variability in 
sufficient detail, safety solutions will emerge that focus on monitoring and controlling the 
system. 
The FRAM is based on four underlying principles (Hollnagel, 2012): 
 Failures and successes are equivalent in the way that they happen for the 
same reason. Alternatively, it can be said that things go wrong for the same 
reasons that they go right. 
 Daily performance of socio-technical systems, including humans 
individually and collectively, is always adjusted to match the system 
conditions. 
 Many of the outcomes of the system that we notice, and also the ones we 
don’t notice, are emergent rather than resultant. 
 Relations and dependencies must be described as they develop in a 
particular situation and not as cause-effect links. This is done through 
functional resonance. 
 
The first step of the FRAM is to describe the functions of the system and the aspects of the 
functions that occur when work happens. Each function can have 6 aspects that should be 
considered, as seen in Figure 3.1.  
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Output: Each function should have an output(s). If work is being done there should be 
something produced by the work. The outputs are then passed throughout the system and 
have the ability to affect other work in the system in 5 possible ways.  
1) Input: The input starts the functions. If the input is an output that arrives late 
from another function, it will affect the functionality of the downstream 
function.  
2) Preconditions: Preconditions must be available prior to the function starting, but 
they do not initiate the function. They can lay dormant in the system until the 
function begins.  
3) Resources: These are things that are processed during the function. To limit the 
resources that are considered, focus should be placed on resources that are 
consumed and subsequently need to be resupplied by another function in the 
system. Resources such as computers, which are not consumed, should not 
considered here. They would be considered as execution conditions, which can 
be assessed when understanding the function itself.  
4) Time: Other functional outputs have the potential to affect the available time to 
carry out a function.  
5) Control: Other functions may interact with downstream functions in a way that 
acts as a control.  
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Figure 3.1: FRAM function diagram (Hollnagel, 2012) 
After the system functions and aspects are described at some level of detail. The variability 
should be considered. Step 2 considers the internal variability of the function and the variety 
of ways an output can be produced under dynamic conditions. Step 3 assesses the coupled 
system variability, which is the way the variations from upstream functions can affect the 
downstream functions, and in turn the entire system performance. The final step is to 
identify appropriate ways to monitor the system and control the variability in it. In practice, 
it is very difficult to obtain all the necessary information at once, so this process may need 
to be repeated as new information is obtained.  
3.5. Methodology 
In order to build a FRAM model for Arctic ship navigation the following methodology was 
used. First, the scope was defined. Then the system functions and connections were 
imagined by the assessor(s). The conceptualized model was then checked with operators to 
verify that the model reflects the way the work is actually done. At this point, the model 
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represented the potential functional paths that could be taken for the system to produce 
some outcome. Then the variability of the functional outcomes can be understood. It is best 
to learn about the variability of the functions by either monitoring the functional output 
directly or communicating with the workers who carry out each function. Once the 
functional model was built and some variability documented, the model was applied to 
cases. By examining cases through the lens of the FRAM, different findings may emerge 
that pertain to functional execution and system variability. These findings can then be used 
to either update the model, or manage the operation. This methodology is mapped out in 
Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2: Methodology for building FRAM model 
3.5.1. Defining the scope 
The first step is to define the scope of the assessment. This assessment focuses on (Arctic) 
ship navigation. From a systemic perspective, there are many functions that influence the 
87 
 
 
performance of a shipping operation and trying to model all of them at once could be 
overwhelming.  As there is so much information to learn about the work that is carried out 
in a shipping operation, the initial assessment focuses on navigating the vessel. This is the 
most basic objective for a ship and all other work is complementary to it. This allows the 
initial understanding to reflect the most immediate functions required for navigation, and 
then the scope can be gradually broadened in the future. Also, the focus will be on transit 
shipping; stationary offshore installations are out of scope. 
 
Figure 3.3: General ship navigation FRAM model (scope) 
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First, build a FRAM model to help define the scope (Figure 3.3). We define a function, 
“Navigate ship,” which describes the function that is carried out to physically move the 
ship from port to port. Then we can define the aspects of the “Navigate ship” function. The 
output can be that the ship is now near the destination, and other functions involved in, 
“Arrive at port,” can begin bringing the ship to the destination. The input is the function 
“Decide to leave port.” While this decision to leave is influenced by the shipping schedule, 
the ship does not necessarily leave exactly when scheduled. Many factors could affect the 
time at which the ship actually leaves port, but this decision is controlled by the schedule. 
The time that this decision will be made will be roughly around the scheduled time, but 
could be ahead or behind schedule, due to inspections, cargo or consumable loading, etc. 
The shipping schedule can also influence the ship navigation function with respect to time. 
The ship navigator may make decisions to speed up or change route to stay on schedule. A 
major controlling aspect for ship navigation is to “Consider operational regulations.” By 
considering these operational regulations, best practices, and guidance can be transferred 
to the ship navigator, helping to control the functionality. A precondition is that a ship must 
either be designed and/or procured and crew must be hired in order to navigate this ship. 
This is a precondition because it must happen prior to the ship navigation, but it does not 
initiate the ship navigation as the input does. The ship and crew can remain at port until the 
decision to leave port has been made, then “Navigate ship” can begin. Lastly, let’s consider 
the resources necessary to navigate a ship. In the FRAM, resources should be focused on 
items that are consumed during or need to be resupplied after a function is executed. While, 
we could think of the ship as being a resource, it will not be consumed (at least not over a 
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single voyage), and is more appropriately considered as a precondition aspect. Resources 
such as cargo and consumables (fuels, stores, ballast, maintenance materials) will be 
consumed during a voyage and should be resupplied before another voyage is to begin. 
 This generalized model (Figure 3.3) has helped us define scope and start thinking 
about ship navigation in terms of the FRAM. However, the model is not yet detailed enough 
to provide much useful insight. Now that the scope is better understood, the focus can be 
shifted to understanding how ship navigation is carried out. 
3.5.2. Building a conceptualized FRAM model 
In the FRAM, it is best to have your assessment informed by the workers who carry out or 
interact closely with the system functions. However, it is useful to first build a 
conceptualized model from the perspective of the assessors to help illustrate the FRAM to 
the worker(s) in the context of their operation. This conceptualized model can be seen in 
Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4: Conceptualized FRAM model for ship navigation 
In Figure 3.4, the ship navigation process is described as a continual assessment of the 
conditions that result in a decision to maintain a course or to change course. This can be 
done many times over a single voyage. The decision then leads to the navigator following 
the chosen course and notifying the crew of any adjustments, if necessary. In order to 
reasonably make an assessment, the ship navigator must consider many conditions 
comprehensively to make the most informed decisions. The outputs from these functions 
may be produced at different rates and assessments by the navigator will be made with 
varying levels of information. Some of the inputs that we can imagine are important to a 
navigator’s assessment are:  
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 Observing the current weather conditions  
 Obtain weather forecasts  
 Observe the ice conditions 
 Obtain ice forecasts  
 Consider the intended or predicted route  
 Monitor the condition of the vessel 
 Be aware of the surrounding location and geography  
3.5.3. Verifying with workers 
To inform our assessment, we spoke with three ship captains. The discussions were focused 
on understanding how ship navigators navigate ships, and making note of any unusual 
variations or conditions that they shared. The representation of ship navigation (Figure 3.4) 
was critiqued by the three ship navigators and it contained many of the functions that the 
navigators used but it was incomplete. Consider the functional descriptions and the initial 
description of the aspects for ship navigation in Table 3.1. The only times that an output 
will by omitted is when it has been left out to define the scope of the analysis. Similarly, 
when “not initially described” is listed, this does not mean that that aspect is not present. It 
means that the scope has initially been limited to describing the coupling of the immediate 
functions that have been described. This will help prevent becoming overwhelmed with 
complexity initially. Additional aspects can be further described later, if needed. 
It can be seen that additional functions have been identified through conversations with 
ship navigators. The visual representation of the FRAM model with input from ship 
navigators can be seen in Figure 3.5. It can be seen that this more detailed description of 
ship navigation shows a more complex representation than the one in Figure 3.4. It is 
important to understand the complexities that are present in ship navigation because these 
complexities must be managed in the operation, whether we decide to model them or not. 
92 
 
 
 
Table 3.1: Initial description of FRAM functions and aspects for ship navigation 
Name of 
function 
Obtain weather 
forecast 
Set new/ maintain 
course 
Observe Ice conditions 
Description Obtain weather 
forecast from 
meteorological 
organization or 
department 
A decision is made to 
either maintain the 
current course or to 
make adjustments to 
course. 
Observe the current ice 
conditions. This can be 
done from the bridge or 
on deck, but also the 
conditions ahead can be 
observed via helicopter 
or aircraft 
Aspect Description of Aspect Description of Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Not initially described Complete or partial 
assessment made 
Not initially described 
Output Weather forecast 
obtained 
Routing decision made Ice conditions have been 
visually observed 
onboard 
Up route ice conditions 
assessed with helicopter 
Precondition Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Resource Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
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Control Experience based 
weather judgement 
Not initially described Experienced visual 
assessment of ice 
Radar image observed 
Time Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Name of 
function 
Forecast Ice 
conditions 
Assess location and 
surrounding geography 
Inform crew of course 
Description Obtain the forecasted 
ice conditions. This 
may be done by 
historical trends in 
area and/or tactical ice 
drift models 
Locate the vessel with 
respect to intended 
route, shipping lanes 
and regional geographic 
features. 
Inform crew of any 
change of course if 
necessary. 
Aspect Description of Aspect Description of Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Output Obtained forecasted 
ice conditions 
Geographical 
assessment made 
Responsible crew 
member notified 
Daily ice chart 
observed 
Precondition Not initially described Aware of the present 
route 
Routing decision made 
Resource Ice chart downloaded Not initially described Not initially described 
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Control Experience based ice 
forecast 
Have shipping lane 
maps 
Not initially described 
Improved knowledge of 
regional specific 
conditions 
Time Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Name of 
function 
Assess location and 
surrounding 
geography 
Make situational 
assessment 
Perform crew work 
Description Locate the vessel with 
respect to intended 
route, shipping lanes 
and regional 
geographic features. 
The captain and bridge 
team make a situational 
assessment based on the 
available information at 
a given time. 
The crew will perform 
their necessary work to 
maintain course or 
adjust their work to 
accommodate any 
changes. 
Aspect Description of Aspect Description of Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Routing decision 
made 
Weather forecast 
obtained 
Responsible crew 
member notified 
Up route ice conditions 
assess. with Helicopter 
Obtained forecasted ice 
conditions 
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Geographical 
assessment made 
Weather has been 
observed 
Aware of apparent 
vessel condition 
Ice conditions have 
been visually observed 
onboard 
Proximate traffic 
communicated with 
Output Not initially described Complete or partial 
assessment made 
Not initially described 
Precondition Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Resource Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Control Not initially described Ice Numeral computed Not initially described 
Time Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Name of 
function 
Observe weather Consider 
predicted/updated route 
Compute Ice Numeral 
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Description The current local 
(ship) weather 
conditions are 
observed. This can be 
from the bridge or on 
deck. 
Consider the current 
route you are transiting. 
This may be suggested 
by operational planners 
or adjusted by the 
navigator. 
Compute the ice 
numeral as per Canadian 
regulatory 
requirements. 
Aspect Description of Aspect Description of Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Not initially described Not initially described Daily ice chart observed 
Output Weather has been 
observed 
Aware of the present 
route 
Ice Numeral computed 
Precondition Not initially described Not initially described Ship classification 
assigned 
Resource Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Control Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Time Not initially described Shipping schedule made Not initially described 
Name of 
function 
Monitor vessel 
condition 
Assign ship 
classification 
Download daily ice 
charts 
Description The vessel's condition 
is monitored to 
understand the 
vessel's current 
capabilities. 
The ship is assigned a 
classification. In 
particular, this 
classification here 
pertains to the category 
Download the daily ice 
chart(s) that are 
applicable to your 
region. These charts are 
produced by Canadian 
97 
 
 
that will be used to 
compute the ice 
numeral. 
Ice Services (CIS) in 
Canada. 
Aspect Description of Aspect Description of Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Output Aware of apparent 
vessel condition 
Ship classification 
assigned 
Ice chart downloaded 
Precondition Engine room 
maintenance/issues 
informed 
Not initially described Not initially described 
Aware of vessel's 
typical capability 
Resource Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Control Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Time Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Name of 
function 
Ice navigator makes 
assessments 
Obtain map of shipping 
lanes 
Observe radar image 
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Description Ice navigator makes 
assessments of the 
conditions and 
upcoming tasks and 
shares experience 
with ships bridge 
team. 
Prior to shipping 
through an area it is 
good practice to obtain 
maps of the shipping 
lanes. The shipping 
lanes typically has more 
reliable soundings and 
have been practiced 
over the years. 
The radar image is 
observed and then 
should be visually 
inspected to determine 
what caused the radar 
image to be produced 
Aspect Description of Aspect Description of Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Output Experienced visual 
assessment of ice 
Have shipping lane 
maps 
Radar image observed 
Experience based ice 
forecast 
Improved knowledge 
of regional specific 
conditions 
Experience based 
weather judgement 
Precondition Ice navigator has been 
assigned 
Not initially described A radar signal has been 
detected by ships radar 
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Resource Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Control Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Time Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Name of 
function 
Observe other traffic Communicate with 
proximate traffic 
Communicate with 
engine room 
Description Observe any other 
shipping traffic that 
may be in the area 
Communicate with 
proximate traffic. This 
can be done via lights, 
horns or radio. 
There is communication 
between the engine 
room and the bridge to 
discuss any issues or 
needed maintenance. 
Aspect Description of Aspect Description of Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Not initially described Other traffic observed Not initially described 
Output Other traffic observed Proximate traffic 
communicated with 
Engine room 
maintenance/issues 
informed 
Precondition Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Resource Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Control Radar image observed Not initially described Not initially described 
Time Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Name of 
function 
Assign certified ice 
navigator 
Detect radar image Become aware of 
vessel's capability 
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Description To assign an ice 
navigator to assist 
with navigation of the 
vessel. This is 
required for 
Navigation in the 
Canadian Arctic. 
Radar signal has been 
sent from ships radar 
and is ready to receive 
any signals that bounce 
back from objects 
The navigator becomes 
aware of the vessel's 
capabilities. The 
navigational, structural 
and operational 
capabilities. 
Aspect Description of Aspect Description of Aspect Description of Aspect 
Input Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Output Ice navigator has been 
assigned 
A radar signal has been 
detected by ships radar 
Aware of vessel's 
typical capability 
Precondition Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Resource Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Control Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Time Not initially described Not initially described Not initially described 
Name of 
function 
Make shipping 
schedule     
Description Expected departure 
and arrival times are 
determined.     
Aspect Description of Aspect     
Input Not initially described     
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Output Shipping schedule 
made     
Precondition Not initially described     
Resource Not initially described     
Control Not initially described     
Time Not initially described     
 
102 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: FRAM model for ship navigation with input from ship navigators 
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3.5.4. Learning Variations 
Figure 3.5 shows a map of the potential ways that a ship could be navigated. But there are 
many ways the ship could be navigated, including combinations of the potential functional 
paths shown in Figure 3.5. This variability must be understood, if it is to be properly 
managed. Also, there will be more Arctic specific knowledge here, because Arctic ship 
navigation is a variation of ship navigation. See Table 3.2 for sources of variability and 
additional notes along with some ways this variability has been managed in the past. This 
model can help to better understand some shipping scenarios. 
Table 3.2: Variability, notes and management strategies with focus on Arctic shipping 
Associated 
Function Sources of potential variability 
Notes and Management 
techniques 
Set new/ maintain 
course 
More than one possible course 
Slow down - allow time to 
receive more information - 
make more informed decision 
Scheduling and expected profits can 
influence decision making   
The amount of consumable onboard 
also affect decision making (route 
selection)   
GPS may not be accurate at high 
latitude   
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Assess location 
and surrounding 
geography 
Coastline and underwater mapping 
may be poor in areas of Arctic   
Sounding could be inaccurate outside 
of shipping lanes   
Consider 
predicted/updated 
route 
Possible multiple routes - NWP has 3 Dynamic set of solutions 
Ice conditions may take you outside 
of shipping lanes   
Search and rescue operation can take 
you outside of shipping lanes   
Compute Ice 
Numeral 
  
This is computed once daily - 
when a new ice chart is 
published. 
  
The computation is based on 
the ice assessment from the ice 
chart - If the chart contains 
errors it will affect the 
appropriateness of the 
computation 
Detect radar 
image 
Small icebergs (growlers) can be 
difficult to detect in ice 
Reduce speed - increase 
reaction time if detected late 
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Small icebergs (growlers) can be 
difficult to detect in large sea states   
Dome shaped icebergs may be 
problematic to detect   
Sleet can affect performance of radar   
Quality of the installed radar 
technology   
Observe Ice 
conditions 
Darkness affects ability to see ice 
conditions 
Good searchlight - very 
valuable and backup 
searchlights 
Experience of Ice navigator and 
Captain 
With uncertain conditions, 
reduce speed to minimize force 
of unexpected impacts 
Real conditions can be worse than 
was forecasted Deal with it and/or turn around 
Ice charts are published 24 hours - 
over 24 hours the ice will move 
Try to use ice chart and radar to 
predict ships position in 
changing ice field. Also send 
helicopter for visual inspection 
if available. Important to 
remember that ice moves with 
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wind and icebergs will move 
with current 
Forecast Ice 
conditions 
Quality of Ice chart 
Quality usually improves if 
aerial assessment of the region 
has been done 
Forecast models may be poor for 
certain regions 
Experienced ice navigator can 
also provide experience based 
forecasts 
Obtain weather 
forecast 
Forecast maybe poor quality or non-
existent for some regions of the Arctic 
Experienced ice navigator can 
also provide experience based 
weather forecasts of local 
weather patterns 
How many weather forecasts are 
available daily?   
Communications problems at high 
latitudes can affect ability to obtain 
forecast   
Observe weather 
conditions 
Can observe variety of conditions - 
Wind and snow can affect visibility - 
Cold rain can expect icing   
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Notice differences from weather 
forecasts 
Ice navigator may be able to 
help determine how weather 
might change 
Make situational 
assessment 
Is full bridge team present? 
Other work commitments may 
take them from bridge when 
assessment is made 
How much time to make assessment 
Can slow down to make more 
time 
Here is the function that influenced by 
all other analysis functions 
Variations of every upstream 
function will influence the 
quality of the assessment here 
Fatigue can affect assessments and 
decision making 
Shift schedules can affect 
fatigue - Ice-induced vibrations 
can affect fatigue 
Ice pressure can be problematic for 
ship navigation, even in low ice 
thickness   
Longer periods of darkness can affect 
decision making   
Slush has the potential to clog cooling 
water intakes, and risk losing engine - 
this has been seen in the past Finer screen over water intakes 
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Icebreaker assistance may be called 
for if conditions become 
unmanageable for vessel. This could 
take some time if not planned for in 
advance 
When following/being towed 
by icebreaker: Keep prop 
turning, May have to follow 
very closely in high ice 
pressure field (channel will 
close in).  Use ice to help stop 
when following closely 
(prevent collision) 
Communicate 
with engine room 
Communicate upcoming 
maintenance 
Work culture may influence 
communication frequency 
Communicate performance issues   
Monitor vessel 
condition 
Wet conditions or open water can 
promote marine icing 
Breaking off the ice can also be 
a dangerous procedure and is 
usually avoided until absolutely 
necessary 
There are icing allowances in stability 
book 
It is very difficult to monitor the 
weight of ice buildup and 
distribution of the weight 
Parallel mid-body stress will be high 
if entering a mobile ice field from fast 
ice (shear zone) Avoid if possible 
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Difficult to monitor (feel) bow 
impacts if bridge is positioned astern   
Backing up in ice 
Keep rudder straight when 
moving astern 
Perform crew 
work 
Crew may not be prepared for and 
have experience in cold climate   
 
3.6. Discussion 
It is important to understand that this model still has missing elements. It can be expanded 
to incorporate more elements to improve our understanding of socio-technical system that 
is ship navigation. It is acknowledged that there are regulatory functions and organizational 
functions omitted from this model. These functions are carried out at lower frequencies 
than the onboard functions, but will influence the onboard work. The next step is to better 
understand how these regulations and organization affect the functionality of ship 
navigation. It may be also appropriate to further define some functions. For example, it may 
be appropriate to break down the “Monitor vessel condition” function into separate 
functions, as in Figure 3.6. 
110 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Breaking function into sub-functions 
Then it may be appropriate to ask: 1) when is the FRAM model “complete”? and 2) How 
do we know if we have sufficient granularity? The model will never be complete but each 
revision should improve the understanding. There is no guarantee that future operations 
will mirror past operations, so there are always new lessons to learn. As long as the system 
is operating, there will be new information to add to your FRAM model. It will depend on 
what you are trying to explain and the explanations you are willing to accept. The detail of 
the function may be acceptable to explain one scenario, but inadequate to explain another. 
In this case, it is important to not try to categorize explanations into two discrete groups, 
right or wrong. Explanations can range from poor to acceptable, and further examination 
will produce better explanations. As more details are understood acceptable explanations 
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will emerge. The question then becomes, what is acceptable? Explanations should be 
sought that not only describe what happened, but how it happened and why it happened. 
By understanding these 3 parts of a scenario, better management strategies will be able to 
be developed. 
In order to demonstrate the utility of this information, it should be used to explain certain 
scenarios from the shipping domain. The FRAM model can be used to add to the 
understanding that have been obtained from traditional examination techniques. In section 
3.6.1 the Exxon Valdez case will be considered. 
3.6.1. Applying a case: the Exxon Valdez grounding 
The Exxon Valdez grounded on March 24, 1989 on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound 
while transporting crude oil from Valdez, Alaska to San Diego, California. This shipping 
accident is one of the most well-known, which garnered much media attention and legal 
intervention because of its environmental impact and ill-defined oil spill response policy. 
In terms of Arctic shipping accidents, the Exxon Valdez case is the most well documented 
accident that is publicly available. This case may be the most suitable case to examine 
through the lens of the FRAM because of the extent of information available compared to 
other cases. 
All information in this case is taken from the National Transportation Safety Board’s 
(NTSB) marine accident report on the Exxon Valdez accident (NTSB, 1990). The NTSB 
performed an extensive investigation and analysis of this accident. The report included 47 
findings that were determined to be relevant to the accident, an account of probable cause, 
and recommendations to the organizations/departments involved. The report has been a 
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very significant document for shipping safety and influenced the adoption of double hull 
tankships across the industry. The adoption of double hull tankships has improved safety 
of the tankship industry, specifically with respect to its relationship to the environment. 
The account of probable cause is as follows (NTSB, 1990): 
“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the 
grounding of the EXXON VALDEZ was the failure of the third mate to properly maneuver 
the vessel because of fatigue and excessive workload; the failure of the master to provide a 
proper navigation watch because of impairment from alcohol; the failure of Exxon 
Shipping Company to provide a fit master and a rested and sufficient crew for the EXXON 
VALDEZ; the lack of an effective Vessel Traffic Service because of inadequate equipment 
and manning levels, inadequate personnel training, and deficient management oversight; 
and the lack of effective pilotage services.” 
This account of probable cause can be visualized by the causal dependency diagram in 
Figure 3.7. 
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Figure 3.7: Causal dependency diagram produced from the account of probable cause given in the 
Marine Accident Report 
Now consider how the grounding would look by applying the information in the grounding 
report to the FRAM model for Arctic ship navigation. The FRAM model shown in Section 
3.5.3 displays the potential functional paths to navigating the vessel. The Exxon Valdez 
case can be used to illustrate the functional dynamics that contributed to the grounding. The 
generalized FRAM model seen in Figure 3.5 represents the potential ways that an Arctic 
ship navigator could operate the ship. However, when a ship navigator operates the vessel, 
many combinations of selected functions may be used. The marine accident report of the 
Exxon Valdez grounding can be used to help understand the functional dynamics that 
occurred during that accident (NTSB, 1990). 
Appendix C shows the functional signature of the Exxon Valdez voyage from 21h21 on 
March 23, 1989 up until the time of the grounding. It should be noted that some of the times 
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are estimated based on the accounts given in the Marine Accident report and the actual time 
may vary slightly from the time stated in this analysis. Each figure represents a snapshot of 
the active functions at a stated time for the Exxon Valdez grounding. The collection of 
these snapshots represent the functional signature of the Exxon Valdez grounding. 
Figure 3.8 shows that at about 23h55 on March 23, 1989 the Navigator (Third Mate) and 
his team were assessing the location of the Exxon Valdez relative to Busby Island Light to 
determine if it was time to turn back towards the shipping lane that they had left to avoid 
glacial ice. At this time, the navigator was using the radar to estimate the vessel’s position 
from Busby Island Light, which he estimated to be 0.9 miles away. Also, a fix was plotted 
on a chart of the vessel’s position from visual observations, which estimated Busby Island 
Light to be 1.1 miles away. There was a discrepancy of 0.2 miles of the navigator’s 
estimates of the vessel’s position. Additionally, during this functional snapshot there was 
an additional functional relationship learned that existed between observing the radar image 
and assessing the vessel’s location and surrounding geography. This relationship was not 
noticed in previous discussions with ship captains and was added to the model (one of the 
blue lines in Figure 3.8) to add to the model’s comprehensiveness. 
In this analysis, the functional signature of the Exxon Valdez was presented. This represents 
a single voyage for this vessel. From this data alone, it is difficult to determine with high 
certainty what caused this accident. However, if there was data available about other 
voyages that the Exxon Valdez had and successfully navigated through Valdez Narrows, 
there would be a better understanding of the functional signatures that promoted better 
performance of the Exxon Valdez. Presumably, the vessel successfully navigated the 
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Narrows before while the captain was away from the bridge, while workers were fatigued, 
or while glacial ice entered into the shipping lanes. By using a method that is capable of 
also analyzing successful voyages, there is a better chance of identifying what was different 
about the functional signatures that promote such different outcomes. Additionally, if this 
information was available, the value of this analysis could be increased. 
By considering systemic safety solutions and understanding the navigational processes, 
additional safety recommendation can be made. For instance, in addition to recommending 
minimizing fatigue by analyzing ideal shift schedules, elements could be introduced into 
the system that help navigators perform better even when fatigued. It can be reasoned that 
even under ideal sleeping conditions, e.g. a person working a 9-5 desk job, a person can 
arrive at work tired or fatigued. Additional recommendations of updating the autopilot 
system to be more evident as to when it was engaged or disengaged, as this was a source 
of confusion for the crew of the Exxon Valdez during the grounding. This could help 
fatigued workers be more aware of the condition of their vessel. Additionally, other 
technologies could be recommended that help ship navigators more accurately assess their 
location in a waterway. In the present, the addition of GPS on vessels may help with this 
although, some of the Captains consulted in section 3.5.3 have expressed concern about 
GPS accuracy at high latitudes. 
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Figure 3.8: Functional representation of the Exxon Valdez grounding at about 23h55 with updated 
functional relationship (blue lines) 
3.7. Conclusions 
In this work, the FRAM has been used to start an investigation into Arctic shipping by 
trying to understand ship navigation and its variations in ice. The process of building a 
FRAM model was discussed and an application of the model was illustrated using the 
Exxon Valdez grounding. After speaking with the ship navigators, a more detailed FRAM 
representation of ship navigation has been developed. Some of the variations and conditions 
that are present in Arctic navigation are discussed along with the ways that ship navigators 
manage these conditions. The grounding of the Exxon Valdez was examined and provided 
context to the information that was made available by the Marine accident report. This case 
allowed for an alternative perspective and complementary discussion of the case than could 
have been had without the FRAM. 
It is acknowledged in this work that there are still elements that factor into the ship 
navigation process that are omitted for now, including many regulatory functions and 
organizational functions. This work serves as an initial starting point to use the FRAM to 
help better understand the complexities that exist for ship navigation in the Arctic. This 
work can be improved in the future by further defining the functional descriptions, 
incorporating more variations that have been experienced, and extending the scope of the 
assessment. The framework to do this is presented in this paper and new information can 
be used to update the model. 
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4. INTEGRATION OF RESILIENCE AND FRAM FOR SAFETY 
MANAGEMENT 
 
4.1. Co-authorship statement 
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writing of this manuscript, including development of the methodology, the discussion of 
this method, development of the FRAM model and functional signatures for driving a car 
to work. All authors revised, edited, discussed this work and made recommendations for 
improvements to its presentation. 
4.2. Abstract 
Resilience is a concept that can be used to bring additional understanding to safety 
management, to complement traditional approaches. The additional understanding will 
enable more informed safety management decisions to be made by operators. This is critical 
for operations in remote and hash environments. The concepts of resilience, such as 
robustness and rapidity, can be used to inform safety management decisions. A 
methodology is presented that uses quantitative techniques of system performance 
measurement and qualitative understanding of functional execution from the Functional 
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Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) to gain an understanding of these resilience concepts. 
Examples of robustness and rapidity using this methodology are illustrated, and how they 
can help operators manage their operation is discussed. 
Keywords: Resilience, FRAM, Safety Measurement, Safety System 
4.3. Introduction 
Risk management is an important part of industrial applications and paramount to the 
success of businesses. Risk is characterized by the probability of unfavorable events 
occurring and the magnitude of their consequences. A fundamental principle of risk is the 
Law of Large Numbers. This says that given a large enough sample size, the expected value 
will converge to its true probabilistic value. But this principle has no bearing on what will 
happen in a single sample. That is why safety assessors must actively monitor operations, 
try to understand precursors to foresee single outcomes as they emerge, and so avoid 
unfavorable ones.    
Many modern work places involve complex operations with many hazards appearing in 
dynamic environmental conditions. This makes it very difficult to foresee outcomes prior 
to commencing the operation. We rely on operators to actively assess and avoid many of 
the hazards that can and will occur during operation. This expertise is a source of resilience, 
which brings the operation success most of the time. Occasionally accidents do occur and 
blame for those accidents is attributed to human error 70-90% of the time (Rothblum, 2000; 
Shappell & Wiegmann, 2004; U.S. Department of Energy, 2009). Most of the time, humans 
are also the reason operations are successful (Hollnagel, 2014). By understanding the 
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human element of operations better, there is an opportunity to manage the operation in a 
way that increases the resilient capabilities of humans, thus minimizing the risk of errors. 
Methods have been proposed to consider technical and human elements of complex socio-
technical systems together (Hollnagel, 2012; N. Leveson, 2004; Vicente, 2004). These 
methods are systemic approaches that focus on modeling technical, organizational, and 
human factors together. By modeling these three factors together, an understanding can be 
obtained of the complex and adaptive nature of modern industrial operations (Borys et al., 
2009). Adaptation to complex system dynamics reflects the resilience, which should be 
understood to help better inform safety management decisions.  
In this paper, a methodology is presented that uses quantitative techniques of system 
performance measurement and qualitative understandings of functional execution from the 
Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) to evaluate resilient capacities of an 
industrial operation and inform safety management decisions. This methodology will help 
bring quantitative and qualitative understandings of resilience together, which has been a 
point of contention in the past. The quantitative part will provide a means to measure and 
evaluate, while the qualitative part will help provide an understanding of the mechanisms 
that produce certain performance measurements. 
4.4. Background 
4.4.1. Resilience 
Resilience is a term that has garnered many definitions in various domains. Manyena 
(2006) compiled definitions of resilience from sources published from 1991 to 2005. Over 
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the 14 year period, it was noted that definitions of resilience have evolved from an outcome, 
to a process that gives rise to an outcome. Another review of resilience definitions by 
Ayyub (2014) concluded that the term resilience was elastic in nature, which could possibly 
explain some ambiguity associated with the term. Definitions vary in level of detail, which 
can be seen in the two following examples, illustrating a vague definition and more detailed 
one, respectively: 1) The ability of an actor to cope with or adapt to hazard stress (Pelling, 
2003); 2) the capacity of a system, community, or society potentially exposed to hazards to 
adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of 
functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social system is 
capable of organizing itself to increase this capacity for learning from past disasters for 
better future protection and to improve risk reduction measures (UNISDR, 2005).  
A common theme in more recent definitions of resilience is the reference to a system’s 
ability or capacity rather than to an outcome. Béné et al. (2016) propose that resilience 
emerges from 3 capacities: absorptive, adaptive, and transformative. Each capacity leads 
to a different outcome: persistence, incremental adjustments, and transformational 
responses, respectively. This framework also proposes that the intensity of the 
shock/stressor applied to the system will determine the capacity that will allow the system 
to cope. For low intensity stressors, the system may use either absorptive, adaptive, or 
transformative capacities to cope, with preference being given to absorptive capacities that 
exhibit system stability. For moderate intensity stressors, the system may use either 
adaptive or transformative capacities to cope, with preference being given to adaptive 
capacities that exhibit system flexibility. For severe intensity stressors, the system may be 
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left with transformative capacities to cope, which would signal that system changes need 
to be made. 
While the definitions of resilience in current literature leave some ambiguity, certain 
techniques can be used to inform operators of resilient qualities that may exist. Park et al. 
(2013) stated that resilience is better understood as an outcome of a recursive process that 
includes sensing, anticipation, learning, and adaptation, making it complementary to risk 
analysis and valuable for adaptive management of complex, coupled engineering systems. 
By monitoring a recursive process of an industrial application, some of the resilient 
capacities of an operation can be understood. This understanding can help improve safety 
management strategies for operators. 
Current understandings of resilience produce definitions that collectively exhibit elasticity, 
which makes monitoring difficult for such an ill-defined parameter. While it is difficult to 
monitor resilience directly, other system parameters can be monitored to improve the 
understanding of resilient capacities that might exist. Monitoring the system’s performance 
recursively can be useful to gaining insight to an operation. As system performance is a 
context specific parameter, it should reflect the requirements or objectives of the operation 
(Ayyub, 2014). 
Using system performance as a signal to monitor resilient capacities can provide insight 
into the persistence of a system. Persistence describes the system’s ability to endure and 
recover from events. More specifically, monitoring system performance can improve the 
understanding of an operation’s robustness and rapidity. Robustness considers a system’s 
performance during an event with respect to its initial or expected performance. Events that 
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produce measurements that signal low robustness may also indicate vulnerabilities in the 
operation. Rapidity describes the system’s recovery with respect to time, an indication of 
how quickly the operation will bounce back after a loss of performance. 
To monitor system performance, the method suggested by Ayyub (2015) can be used, as 
seen in Figure 4.1. System performance is almost always variable, so it can be monitored 
continuously on a performance spectrum, rather than as binary states of acceptable and not 
acceptable. Tracking the performance over time with respect to a defined datum will allow 
for monitoring of the system’s resilient capacities. In Figure 4.1, system performance is 
measured as a percentage of the system’s expected performance. In practice, the metric 
could be adjusted to reflect the main objective of the system. 
 
Figure 4.1: Measuring system performance over time 
By monitoring system performance, some of the resilient properties of a system can start 
to be understood. Monitoring the system’s overall performance can help understand 
robustness and rapidity of the operation. How robust the system is and how rapid the system 
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recovers can be understood by the recursive monitoring of a system’s performance over 
many events. This is an important step in operational management, which gives an 
appreciation of how the operation may respond to events. Monitoring system performance 
alone does not provide much insight to what system elements give rise to robustness and 
rapidity (or lack thereof) for the operation. Identification of the system elements that 
contribute to these resilient abilities can be useful for safety management. The Functional 
Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) can be used to track the functional dynamics of an 
operation that give rise to the system performance measurements. Monitoring the 
functional dynamics and measuring the system’s performance together can help identify 
these system elements. 
4.4.2. FRAM 
The FRAM is a method that produces a functional model. The model contains two main 
parameters: functions and variability. The functions should first be mapped to describe the 
potential functional pathways that are available in an operation, and provide an 
understanding of the connectivity of the work in that operation. The variability 
characterizes the variable nature of functional outputs and functional pathways that are 
actually taken in the operation.  By modeling the system functions and variability in 
sufficient detail, valuable insights may emerge that can help inform safety management of 
complex operations.  
The FRAM is based on four underlying principles (Hollnagel, 2012): 
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 Failures and successes are equivalent in the way that they happen for the 
same reason. Alternatively, it can be said that things go wrong for the same 
reasons that they go right. 
 Daily performance of socio-technical systems, including humans 
individually and collectively, is always adjusted to match the system 
conditions. 
 Many of the outcomes of the system that we notice, and the ones we don’t 
notice, are emergent rather than resultant. 
 Relations and dependencies must be described as they develop in a situation 
and not as cause-effect links. This is done through functional resonance. 
The first step of the FRAM is to describe the functions of the system and the aspects of the 
functions that occur when work happens. Each function can have six aspects that should be 
considered in the model, as shown in   (see Figure 4.2) (Hollnagel, 2012).  
 
 
The six aspects that should be considered include: 
Figure 4.2: FRAM function diagram (Hollnagel, 2012) 
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1) Output: Each function should have an output(s). If work is being done, there should be 
something produced by the work. The outputs are then passed throughout the system and 
have the potential to affect other work in the system in up to five ways.  
2) Input: The input starts the functions. If the input is an output that arrives late from 
another function, it will affect the functionality of the downstream function.  
3) Preconditions: Preconditions must be available prior to the function starting, but they 
do not initiate the function. They can lay dormant in the system until the function begins.  
4) Resources: These are processed during the function. To limit the resources that are 
considered, focus should be on resources that are consumed and need to be resupplied by 
another function in the system.  
5) Time: Other functional outputs have the potential to affect the available time to carry 
out a function.  
6) Control: Other functions may interact with a downstream function in a way that acts as 
a control. 
After the system’s functions and aspects are described at some level of detail, the variability 
should be considered. Step 2 is to consider the internal variability of the function and the 
variety of ways an output can be produced under dynamic conditions. Step 3 is to assess 
the coupled system variability: the way the variations from upstream functions can affect 
the downstream functions and, in turn, the entire system performance. The final step is to 
identify appropriate ways to monitor the system and control the variability in it. In practice, 
it is very difficult to obtain all the necessary information at once and this process may need 
to be repeated as new information is obtained.  
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In practical terms, building the FRAM model provides an understanding of the potential 
ways that an operation could succeed. The variability provides an understanding of the 
ways that an outcome of the system is achieved, including both successes and failures. 
Variability can be examined in two ways: 1) as a variable signal of an output of single and 
combined functions, and 2) the variable functional paths that produce an outcome of the 
system. This variability can be tracked at a time step of the operation as seen in Figure 4.3, 
with labeled outputs of the variability of individual functions for that time step, and 
highlighted functions that show the active functions for that time step. This can also be 
stored in tabular form in a database. The monitoring of the particulars of variability of a 
given event produces a functional signature for that event. 
 
Figure 4.3: A variation of work functions for a given time (t) 
4.5. Methodology 
Well informed safety management decisions should be made using the most comprehensive 
knowledge possible. In the past, applications of resilience to safety management have been 
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either quantitative or qualitative. The methodology presented here helps bring quantitative 
and qualitative knowledge together to better inform safety management decisions. 
Quantitatively, system performance monitoring can help operators evaluate the variable 
performance of an operation. Over time, the performance of the operation due to dynamic 
conditions can be understood. This will first help to characterize the range and frequency 
of system performance values that are measured, then operators can have discussions 
regarding the need or opportunity to improve system performance. Additionally, by 
connecting the functional signatures of an operation to each system performance 
measurement, understanding of the system elements that contribute to resilient capacities 
can be gained. This understanding of the overall effect on the system’s performance, 
combined with the understanding of the contributors to that performance, can help 
operators more effectively manage their operation. 
Figure 4.4 displays a methodology for using resilience concepts and FRAM to understand 
and manage complex operations. This involves monitoring the system’s performance and 
its corresponding functional signatures. Once system performance measurements and their 
functional signatures are collected, the measurements can be grouped into bins of similar 
levels of performance. For example, the measurements collected between 95%-100% 
system performance could be grouped together, as a high performance group. This group 
can be examined and compared to the other measurements. It can then be examined if the 
high-performance group exhibits any unique functional signatures. If so, those unique 
features may allow managers to incorporate them into more operations to promote higher 
performance more regularly. These unique features are functional contributors that 
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contribute to a level of performance that falls within the grouping range. However, the 
identification of functional contributors is dependent on the number of cases examined and 
the content of those cases. Functional contributors may not always be identifiable during 
each examination, rather they may emerge as certain information is seen through the 
monitoring process. When functional contributors of certain performance levels are 
identified, operators can use the quantitative and qualitative understanding to manage their 
operation appropriately.  
 
Figure 4.4: Methodology for managing system resilience 
This methodology provides a framework to help bring a better understanding of resilience 
to operators and enable them to manage the system by bringing additional insights 
regarding resilience to their operation. The method adds opportunities to learn from 
successful operations, as opposed to more traditional methods that focus on failures to 
inform safety and operational management. The method uses performance measurements, 
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as seen in Figure 4.1, and corresponding functional signatures, as seen in Figure 4.3, for 
each performance measurement to monitor the operation. As samples of the functional 
dynamics and performance measurements are collected, a range of performance levels can 
then be examined. The performance levels can be categorized into groups of high and low 
performance, or sliced into as finely or as coarsely as the examiner would like to 
investigate.  
 
 
Figure 4.5: Examining low performance system measurements 
The performance level can be defined as seen in Figure 4.5 by grouping low performance 
system measurements together. The functional signatures of the low performance group 
should be compared to all other functional signatures for the remaining measurements. 
Trends may emerge for functional contributors that produce low performance 
measurements, as opposed to higher performance measurements. This information will 
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allow operators to manage out low performance measurements due to the identified 
functional contributor, which would increase robustness. 
Additionally, the performance level could be grouped into high performance 
measurements, as seen in Figure 4.6. By comparing the functional signatures of the high-
performance measurements to the functional signatures of the remaining performance 
measurements, trends may emerge for the functional contributors that produce high 
performance. This information can be used by management to promote high performance 
of their operation, which would also increase robustness. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Examining high performance system measurements 
Another resilient capability is the system’s ability to recover after a loss of performance, 
which is rapidity. By grouping measurements that exhibit increasing system performance 
together, as seen in Figure 4.7, understanding of the operation’s rapidity can be gained. By 
monitoring the system’s functional signatures over the recovery, information will emerge 
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regarding the system’s rapidity. This information can help managers promote faster 
recovery after low performance measurements are seen. 
 
Figure 4.7: Examining system rapidity 
The identification of functional contributors is emergent because the understanding of the 
contributors may not be evident after every examination of the system. As more samples 
are taken under various operational conditions, the functional contributors may emerge. 
Also, once the functional contributors start to emerge, the greater the number of samples 
that are seen will provide more evidence of a given contributor’s impact on the operation. 
More evidence of the operational impacts of a functional contributor will help support a 
manager’s decisions regarding the operation. 
4.6. Discussion 
In order to enrich the understanding of this method, it will be demonstrated using an easily 
relatable example - driving a car to work. The data presented in this example is 
hypothetical, but should serve to convey the application of the method. In order to track 
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functional signatures, a functional model must be created. To track system performance, a 
performance metric must be determined.  
A performance metric should capture the main objective of the operation, which for driving 
to work is to get you to work on time. Monitoring if you get to work on time or not would 
be binary and not show any difference in performance whether you were 1 minute late or 
1 hour late. In order to capture these specifics of the operation it would be better to measure 
the time it takes to drive to work. It may also be useful to reference that metric against a 
performance datum to observe if the measured performance is approximately close to an 
expected level of performance. In this example, it is assumed that 25 minutes is a reasonable 
time to drive to work. This will be used as the performance datum and the metric will then 
be given as a percentage of system performance as shown in Equation 4.1. 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 (mins)
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 (𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠)
× 100% =  
25 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 (𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠)
× 100% (4.1) 
To build a functional model the FRAM can be used. The FRAM provides guidelines for 
building the functional model. The FRAM asks the assessor to describe the functions 
involved in the operation and the relations between the functions. This description will 
serve as a functional model. Figure 4.8 shows the FRAM model for driving a car. In 
practice, it would be wise at this stage to exercise the model, make observations of the 
operation you are modelling, and check that they are consistent with the model. However, 
in this hypothetical example it will be assumed that this version of the model is valid.  
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Figure 4.8: FRAM model for driving a car 
This model shows the potential functions that could be executed while driving a car. 
Actually, this model describes the potential functions that could be executed to make 
driving decisions based on monitoring information and selecting/following routes. The 
model may repeat itself many times over a drive to work. Anytime you drive to work the 
outputs of the functions may be variable and only a portion of the functions may be used at 
specific times. This reflects the variability element of the FRAM and by tracking these 
variable processes over time a functional signature of the event can be captured. 
Now that the metric has been defined and the functional model has been built, the operation 
can be monitored to understand the performance being achieved and the processes that are 
leading to certain levels of performance. 
Suppose that over a period of time the system performance was measured for each drive to 
work. The hypothetical performance is displayed in Figure 4.9. These measurements give 
137 
 
 
a sense of the level of performance being achieved in the operation and the variability in 
performance. Figure 4.9 alone does not provide much insight as to why certain levels of 
performance are occurring. To help gain this insight, functional signatures can be used. 
 
Figure 4.9: System performance measurements for driving car to work 
Each measurement in Figure 4.9 has a functional signature. Each functional signature will 
provide insight to the functionality of the system for each measurement. Consider that a 
snapshot of one functional signature from the high performance group is displayed in 
Figure 4.10. This partial functional signature shows a portion of the functional activity that 
occurred on that drive to work. It is important to remember that this functional signature 
will be much longer than what is displayed, but it is not practical display the entire signature 
here. It can be seen that very specific functional outputs are recorded for each function, 
including the specific road you are on, the exact speed you are travelling, the road condition, 
if pedestrians are near, and so on. The particulars of each function will influence decisions 
that the driver will make on the way to work. It should also be noted that non-active 
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functions during each occurrence of the model are not displayed here. This is optional and 
was done to remove clutter from the figure. If this functional signature provides insight into 
the functionality of one drive to work, then other drives to work can be compared to it. Do 
others from the high performance group exhibit similar/different functionality? The answer 
to this question will influence the way you may manage your drives to work.  
 
Figure 4.10: Snapshot of one functional signature 
Figure 4.11 shows another snapshot of a functional signature. Suppose this signature is 
from the low performance group. This signature shows different particulars than Figure 
4.10. Different roadways are used and an additional function (“Assess signage”) is active, 
which was not active for the snapshot shown in Figure 4.10. This signature can be compared 
to others in the low performance group and others in the high performance group. The 
understanding that is gained by examining these functional patterns and their relationships 
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to high or low performance can help you manage your drives to work. Similarly, the 
functional signatures that occur during the time when system performance was recovering 
(see recovery groups - Figure 4.9) can provide insight to the mechanisms that promoted 
recovery. Understanding this recovery process may inform future management decisions 
that could promote quicker recovery. 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Snapshot of a second functional signature 
While this example was chosen to provide a relatable example for readers of diverse 
backgrounds, the method can be applied in a similar manner for other applications. If the 
modelled operation is much more complex, the value of monitoring the system performance 
and tracking functionality would increase.  
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4.7. Conclusions 
The methodology presented in this paper combines quantitative and qualitative techniques 
to provide a pathway for operators to evaluate, understand, and manage their operations 
using resilience. Using system performance measurement brings a quantitative element to 
the qualitative understanding of the functional assessment given by the FRAM, which 
allows for more informed evaluation of the qualitative information. Examining different 
performance levels allows for the identification of functional contributors for any level of 
performance. This information can then be used to support decision making for operators 
looking to promote or avoid certain levels of performance in their operation. Resilient 
elements such as robustness and rapidity can be understood by using this methodology as 
was seen in the examples in Section 3. This unique method can provide operators a means 
to understand their operation in a way that can support operational decision making based 
on quantitative and qualitative resilience concepts. 
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5. VISUALIZING AND UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL 
DYNAMICS OF A SHIPPING OPERATION 
5.1. Co-authorship statement 
A version of this manuscript has been presented at the 2018 Society of Naval Architects 
and Marine Engineers (SNAME) Maritime Convention and has been accepted for 
publication in the SNAME transactions journal. The manuscript was written by authors, 
Doug Smith, Erik Veitch, Brian Veitch, Faisal Khan, and Rocky Taylor.  Author Doug 
Smith led the writing of this manuscript, including the development of the methodology, 
the creation of the FRAM model, creation of the functional signatures, and the data 
analysis. Eric Veitch performed the ice management simulator experiment and shared that 
data. Erik Veitch also contributed to writing the Ice management experiment section of this 
paper and assisted with the data analysis. All authors revised, edited, discussed this work 
and made recommendations for improvements to its presentation. 
5.2. Abstract 
In this paper, a method is presented for visualizing and understanding the operational 
dynamics of a shipping operation. The method uses system performance measurement and 
functional signatures. System performance measurement allows assessors to understand the 
level of performance that is being achieved by the operation. The functional signatures then 
provide insight into the functional dynamics that occur for each level of performance. By 
combining system performance measurement with functional signatures, there is a 
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framework to help understand what levels of performance are being achieved and why 
certain levels of performance are being achieved. The insight gained from this approach 
can be helpful in managing shipping operations. Data from an ice management ship 
simulator is used to demonstrate this method and compare different operational approaches. 
5.3. Introduction 
In order for shipping operations to succeed, a complex set of dynamic operational 
conditions must be managed. The management of these conditions requires prior planning 
to ensure adequate resources are in place for operators, but the real-time dynamic 
conditions must also be managed, which require adjustments to be made to work processes 
by the ship’s operators. The combined effect of managerial planning and operational 
actions determines whether or not the operation will succeed or fail. By considering the 
dynamic management structure of a shipping operation, it can be reasoned that the 
processes that produce both successes and failures are similar. The outcomes may be 
different, but processes behind them have many similarities. 
Failures are often the focus of operational assessments where lessons are learned and 
management strategies are updated. In these failure based assessments, a large portion of 
the blame is typically placed on human error, roughly 70-90% in the maritime domain 
(Rothblum, 2000). This is reflective of the integral role humans play in operations. The 
hindsight bias that is present in retro-analytical assessments is not present for operators 
when they adjust to the operational conditions in real time. To manage an operation 
effectively, it should be understood what actions are producing good and bad outcomes, 
what conditions are present during these cases, and what conditions are promoting these 
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operational responses. A better understanding of these questions can be obtained by also 
examining the successes of an operation with a focus on the processes that produce them. 
Traditionally, successes are not examined, or at least not examined at the same level of 
detail as failures. By modeling and tracking successful and unsuccessful outcomes together, 
there is an opportunity to better understand the operational dynamics of a shipping 
operation, which can be useful to inform ship management decisions. In order to effectively 
understand success and failure in the same model, the system should be modelled as 
comprehensively as possible, including the system’s inter-relations. This is a systemic 
modelling approach. Systemic modelling is useful for modelling larger dynamic systems 
that have non-linear behaviors. In other words, the behavior of the system cannot be 
explained by reducing the system to its individual components and explaining the system 
as the sum of its parts. In this approach, it not appropriate to reduce systems to their 
individual components, so a certain level of complexity will be present to capture inter-
relations between components. In order to understand this complexity, the concept of 
emergence is used (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006; Leveson, 2004). These non-linear 
behaviors will be difficult to predict and the behaviors may produce significantly different 
outcomes due to very small changes (or even no change) in the system conditions. In that 
sense, it is conceptualized that new understandings emerge, as the system is studied 
recursively over time. An assumption that the same initial conditions will produce the same 
outcome is not valid using this approach. As the outcomes and system behaviors are 
studied, new understandings will emerge for the system components and inter-relations. 
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This is an appropriate approach to apply to a ship operation, which is a complex socio-
technical system (Morel & Chauvin, 2006). 
We propose a methodology that allows understanding and visualization of a wide range of 
operational outcomes of a shipping operation. The method involves tracking the 
performance of the operation for every operational case (Ayyub, 2014). In order to do this, 
a suitable metric has to be used to track performance, which changes the concept of success 
and failure from binary to a continuous scale of performance ranging from low to high. 
Then to understand the processes that produce each outcome, we propose using the 
functional resonance analysis method (FRAM) (Hollnagel, 2012). The FRAM allows 
complex work processes and dynamic conditions to be visualized. By considering the 
variable performance of a shipping operation continuously, and then considering the work 
processes that produce them, there is an opportunity to learn from success as well as failure, 
better understand a complicated accident mechanism, such as human error, and ultimately 
more effectively manage ship operations. This method will be demonstrated here by using 
ice management simulator cases. This will help demonstrate how this method could be 
applied to a shipping operation. 
5.4. Methodology 
System performance measurement combined with FRAM can be used as a diagnostic tool 
for operational management and design. System performance measurement allows the 
performance of the operation to be monitored and provides insight to the level of 
performance that is being achieved by the operation. System performance measurement 
alone does not explain why certain levels of performance are being achieved. To help 
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provide insight as to why a certain level of performance is being achieved, FRAM can be 
used. FRAM can help visualize the functional dynamics that occurred during a given 
operation, which resulted in the measured performance level of the operation. The 
functional dynamics are captured in a functional signature that is specific to each 
measurement. Once a number of performance measurements and functional signatures are 
collected, comparisons of the functional signatures that produce different levels of 
performance can be made. This could provide insight into good practices and poor 
practices. The managers can then try to promote the practices that result in high 
performance, and remove the practices that are linked to poor performance. 
Consider the flow chart for this methodology shown in Figure 5.1. The first step is to 
define a metric that describes the performance of the system and build a FRAM model of 
the operation that will be considered. Then the system performance can be monitored and 
functional signatures can be tracked for the operation. Once a number of measurements 
and signatures are obtained, they can be compared individually and as groups. The 
signatures can be compared in terms of magnitude of outputs, functional paths taken, 
temporal distribution of functionality, and other quantities that may be of interest.  
Individually, the signatures can be examined to understand how the signatures of one 
measurement may be different from another. Additionally, the performance measurements 
can be grouped into bins and examined as groups, which could be useful in determining if 
there are common practices that are characteristic to a certain level of performance. After 
examining the functional signatures and the performance measurements, some insight 
related to system functionality and safety may emerge. If some insight is gained from the 
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examination, it can be used to help manage the operation. If no insightful conclusions can 
be made from the examination, the system measurements and functional signatures can 
continue to be monitored. Insights may emerge with the inclusion of additional data. It is 
also possible that choosing a different bin size for the grouping assignment may allow for 
insight to emerge with different performance level groups. 
 
Figure 5.1: Flow chart of methodology 
5.4.1. Functional Signatures 
A FRAM model should describe the potential ways that the work can be carried out for an 
operation (Hollnagel, 2012). The FRAM model is a collection of nodes representing the 
functions or activities that make up the operation. The nodes (or functions) can be 
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connected by different relationships: Inputs, Outputs, Time, Control, Preconditions, and 
Resources (Figure 5.2). 
 
Figure 5.2: Node for FRAM model 
The model does not describe the way the work actually happens. At any time (t), only a 
portion of the modelled functions may be active. The outputs that are produced by each 
function can also vary with time. In order to produce the functional signature for an 
operational case, the functional outputs and active functions are tracked over time. Figure 
5.3 shows a functional signature at a time (t), where the active functions (shown in bold) 
and output variability is displayed (as an “output variation” label on the lines that extent 
from a function’s output port). 
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Figure 5.3: Functional Signature 
5.5. Ice Management Simulator Experiment 
An experiment was done using a ship simulator configured for an ice management 
operation. Thirty-three participants used the simulator to execute an operation that 
consisted of clearing pack ice from a lifeboat launch site at an offshore petroleum 
installation. Participants were also informed that their speed should not exceed 3 knots in 
the simulated ice conditions, as per the POLARIS ice navigation risk index in the Polar 
Code (IMO, 2017). The POLARIS system or similar support system has to be used by ships 
navigating in polar waters. This regulation is intended to prevent hull damage due to ice. 
The simulator is powered by PhysX Rigidbody collision software (NVIDIA, 2017) and 
allows for full mission simulation tailored for specific vessels, geographic areas, wind, sea, 
ice, and current conditions. The simulator includes a (6½ ft by 6½ ft) platform that serves 
as bridge deck, mounted in the centre of a 360-degree panoramic projection screen (Figure 
5.4). 
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Figure 5.4: Sketch of the Ice Management Simulator setup 
The Own-ship (the vessel in which the simulation takes place) is modelled as an Anchor 
Handling Tug Supply (AHTS) vessel. It has a length overall of 75m and is powered by twin 
5369 kW diesel engines. For propulsion, it has two controllable pitch (CP) propellers and 
rudders, and forward and aft tunnel thrusters, each with 895 kW of power. The simulator 
has forward and after consoles from which to maneuver the vessel. To switch between 
consoles, the driver has to turn to the opposing console and transfer controls using 
“Transfer” toggle switches. Both consoles have identical basic controls: main propellers 
(port and starboard), steering, and tunnel thrusters (fore and aft). 
Although the console provides all the fundamental controls for manual maneuvering, it was 
simplified for the experiment in that it did not include navigational aids like radar, GPS, or 
chart systems. While seakeeping and maneuvering characteristics were modelled closely to 
that which might be expected in reality, there were general limitations of similitude. In the 
face of such hardware and software limitations, the key to recording meaningful results 
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stemmed from three controls: 1) each participant experienced the exact same experimental 
set-up, 2) no participant had encountered such a simulator before, and 3) each participant 
was given three “habituation” tasks, lasting almost an hour in total, which provided each 
participant with baseline experience with the simulator, including its minor limitations. 
These measures allowed the experimenters in the original study by Veitch et al. (2018) to 
focus on its main intention: to study the general strategies and techniques used in ice 
management. 
An Instructor Station was used by the experimenters to control and monitor the experiment. 
A two-way radio provided the means of communication between the experimenters and the 
bridge officer on deck. Two experimenters were always within an arm’s reach of the radio; 
one provided the main instructions about starting and stopping the simulation; the other 
played the role of watch keeper, who provided information about distances to physical 
targets when prompted by the bridge officer during simulation. 
An array of five computers collected data during the simulations. This included a time 
history of ice concentration within a specified zone, as well as position, speed, and heading.  
A video “Replay” file was also recorded during each simulation, which upon playback 
showed the entire simulation from start to finish. Figure 5.5 shows a screenshot example 
from such a Replay video.  
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Figure 5.5: Snapshot of a replay file 
5.6. Data Analysis 
The data analysis of this experiment consisted of assessing the overall performance of each 
participant and determining the functional signatures for each participant, as per the 
methodology section. 
5.6.1. System Performance Measurement 
The metric used to define the performance of each participant is the percentage of time 
that the lifeboat launch zone was free of ice. Each participant performed ice management 
for 30 mins, so the best performing participants were deemed to have kept the area under 
the lifeboat launch zone ice free for the longest amount of time within the 30 minute 
simulation. 
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The lifeboat launch zone was defined as a circular area of radius 8 m located 8 m off the 
port quarter where the lifeboat davits are located. An image processing script was then 
used to determine if ice was present in the lifeboat launch zone. Figure 5.6 shows an 
overhead view of the circular area adjacent to the FPSO. The images were checked at a 
resolution of 30 s for the 30 minute simulation. The ice conditions in the circular area were 
assumed to be constant for each 30 s interval. After processing all 33 cases, the 
performance was determined for each participant. 
 
Figure 5.6: Lifeboat launch zone with ice piece inside 
Figure 5.7 shows the range of performance that was observed over the 33 cases. 
Performance ranged from 63% to 0%, which corresponds to 18.9 and 0 minutes where the 
lifeboat launch zone is ice free during the 30 minute simulation. Each participant is 
identified by a label. Participant C79 performed the best in this experiment and C07, J42, 
S28, S41, and Z11 had the lowest performance 
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Figure 5.7: System performance measurements for experimental data 
5.6.2. Functional Signature Analysis 
A FRAM model was used to track the functional signatures for each participant. The FRAM 
model used can be seen in Figure 5.8. This model shows the potential functions that can be 
employed by the driver of the vessel in the experiment. The model is repetitive in the sense 
that it is a decision making model and each participant has to make many decisions over 
the course of the simulation. A ship navigator is constantly observing conditions, making 
assessments, and then deciding whether to maintain a course or make an adjustment 
(change course). Each function will have a dynamic output(s). The magnitude of the 
output(s) are displayed in the box that is located on the line that connects the function’s 
output to a downstream function. Some functions will be more dynamic than others. For 
instance, the output of the function, “compute POLARIS risk index,” does not change over 
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the course of each participant’s run. However, the awareness of this “static” output may 
influence the way each participant makes decisions (it is connected to a control node “make 
situational assessment” function). Conversely, changing course, monitoring vessel 
parameters, and observing the ice conditions happen many times over the scenario. 
In order to determine when decisions and actions were made by the navigator, the 
functional signature was approximated. It is not known exactly when the participant was 
trying to make a course change (speed or heading), but it can be approximated by examining 
the peaks and troughs in the speed trace. A trough implies that a speed change was made 
to increase speed and a peak implies a speed change was made to decrease speed. See 
Figure 5.9 for an example of the approximated speed changes in the speed trace. The 
locations of the speed changes are circled. To filter out peaks due to signal noise, only peaks 
Figure 5.8: FRAM model for ice management simulator experiment 
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and troughs greater than 0.1 kts relative to the previous peak or trough were considered. 
Similarly, the vessel heading trace was used to approximate heading changes. See Figure 
5.10  for an example of approximated heading changes in the heading trace. To filter out 
noise in the heading trace, only peaks or troughs greater than 5 degrees relative to the 
previous heading change were considered 
 
Figure 5.9: Finding peaks and troughs in a sample speed trace 
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Figure 5.10: Finding peaks and troughs in a sample heading trace 
The output for observing ice conditions was also approximated. It was assumed that the 
navigator checked the ice conditions in the lifeboat zone at least once every 30 s. This was 
the resolution of the data for the presence of ice in the lifeboat zone. 
Times when the speed of 3 knots was exceeded and very high ice loads occurred were 
flagged. This can help understand when the highest ice loads were on the vessel, and 
particularly, the relationship between the highest ice loads and speeds above the regulatory 
maximum as imposed by the POLARIS system. 
Based on these criteria, a case file was generated for each participant. The case file 
contained time stamped events, such as speed and heading changes, ice observations, speed 
limit violations, and very high ice loads. 
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This case file allows the functional signatures to be produced. As the simulated time 
elapses, the events in the case file can be displayed in a video format. This helps visualize 
the functional dynamics for each participant. 
The best performing participant was C79. Snapshots from the functional signature from 
participant C79 can be seen in Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12. 
 
Figure 5.11: Snapshot of functional signature for participant C79 at 100 seconds 
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Figure 5.12: Snapshot of functional signature for participant C79 at 684 seconds 
Also, snapshots of the functional signature from participant V42 can be seen in Figure 
5.13 and Figure 5.14. The functional signature is different from C79, Figure 5.13 and 
Figure 5.14 show different functional paths and different outputs than for C79. This 
combination of functional activity and functional outputs happened to produce a lower 
level of performance. 
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Figure 5.13: Snapshot of functional signature for V42 at 0 seconds 
 
Figure 5.14: Snapshot of functional signature for V42 at 13 seconds 
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5.7. Comparison 
After the functional signatures were approximated and the performance quantified for each 
participant, the functional signatures were compared. This can be a basis for understanding 
why one person performed better than another, and also for identifying practices that are 
common to high or low performance types. The functional signatures contain information 
pertaining to the function execution for each participant, including the outputs of tasks, the 
relationships between them, and the times at which the tasks occur. Once the operation has 
been tracked at this level of detail, there are many ways in which data can be examined. 
The comparison presented here is not exhaustive, in that there are other possible ways to 
analyze this data set. There are many ways functionality can be assessed to understand the 
execution and temporal aspects, and each way may allow different qualities to be 
understood. In this comparison, a moderate depth investigation of the functional signatures 
is made to demonstrate the method and obtain some understanding of effective and 
ineffective practices.  
The first step is to bin the performance measurements from Figure 5.7 to “group” the data. 
The bins can be setup to the desired levels of granularity that the assessor wishes to 
investigate. In this assessment, the bins were chosen to be 0-25%, 25-50%, and 50-75% to 
represent poor performance, medium performance, and high performance, respectively, 
(see Figure 5.15). The groups are then examined using a boxplot.  The boxplot bounds the 
25th and 75th percentiles of the data, and contains a line in the box that represents the 
median. Whiskers extend from the box to the outer most data point that falls within +/- 2.7 
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times the standard deviation. Data points outside the limit are considered outliers and are 
denoted by a “+” symbol. 
 
Figure 5.15: System performance measurements with bin size displayed (red line) 
The groups were then examined to understand the functional activity of each group. This 
measure can provide insight into the level of functional activity that occurs in each group. 
Figure 5.16 shows the functional activity for the 3 groups in this assessment. For each group 
there is a wide variation in functional activity, with the 0.25-0.5 group having the least 
variability. 
The number of specific active functions (number of speed changes, number of heading 
changes, and the number of ice observations in the lifeboat zone) can also be examined in 
a similar manner to determine which functions were the most active for each group.   
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Figure 5.16: Functional activity of each group (n is number of participants in each group) 
The temporal distribution of the functional signatures can be examined as well. Figure 5.17 
shows the time distribution of active functions. It shows that the high performance group 
is more functionally active in the earlier part of the simulation than the other 2 groups. 
Similarly, the time distributions for each specific function can be examined this way. 
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Figure 5.17: Time distribution of functional activity for each group 
The variability for the functional outputs can also be monitored, which can be used to help 
understand the nature of the output variability for certain functions. For instance, the vessel 
speed is an output of the “monitor vessel parameters” function. This output is displayed in 
the functional signature every time the “monitor vessel parameters” function is active. 
Figure 5.18 shows the distribution of vessel speed for the participants’ speed changes 
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Figure 5.18: Speed output at speed changes for each group (kts) 
The functional signatures promote the monitoring of many system parameters by way of 
functional outputs. This allows certain system parameters, such as regulations, to be 
examined. In many systems, regulations are created to improve safety, but rarely are the 
effects of the regulation checked to see if they are as intended. Also, the possibility that a 
regulation could have unintended effects on the system can be examined. 
For example, the influence of the POLARIS ice navigation risk index can be examined. 
Two outputs that were tracked as outputs of the “monitor vessel parameters” function were 
the vessel speed and maximum local ice load on the hull. The number of speed violations 
and the speed at which high ice loads occur can be tracked. The ice loads computed by the 
simulator are not validated and therefore a qualitative scale of low, medium, high, and very 
high is used here to qualify ice load events. While the exact magnitude of the ice loads 
cannot be confirmed, this metric does give an indication of the points in the simulation 
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where high levels of energy are being transferred to the ship’s hull via ice. Figure 5.19 and 
Figure 5.20 show the number of speed violations that occurred for each participant and the 
speed at which very high ice loads occurred, respectively. 
 
Figure 5.19: Number of speed violations per participant 
From this examination, it can be seen there were speed violations recorded for most 
participants. The majority of participants had 0, 1, or 2 speed violations for the entire 
simulation, with the exception of  “R73” who had 11. It is also of interest that “R73,” who 
disregarded the speed limit the most, also performed in the top group with respect to 
clearing ice from the lifeboat zone. Figure 5.20 also shows that the majority of very high 
ice load events occurred at speeds below 3 knots.  
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Figure 5.20: Vessel speed at very high ice loads 
It is also important to consider each participant individually as well as by group. Consider 
the speed output of the high performance group (0.5-0.75 group) in Figure 5.18. The group 
data suggests that those participants transit the ice much faster than the other groups. 
However, by looking at the speed output over the entire speed trace for each participant, it 
can be seen that many of the high speed recordings were due to participant “R73.” The 
other 3 participants in the high performance group mainly operated at lower speeds.  Figure 
5.21 shows the speed distribution for the speed traces, which was logged every second, of 
each participant in the high performing group (0.5-0.75 group). 
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Figure 5.21: Speed distribution for each participant in the high performance group (0.5-0.75) 
By further examining this group it can be seen that 3 participants, “A90”, “C79”, and “N25” 
had a similar approach to this operation, while “R79” had a different approach. “A90”, 
“C79”, and “N25” all approached the lifeboat zone from the south and moved to a position 
north of the lifeboat zone and held that position to block  the south drifting ice from entering 
the lifeboat zone. “R79” moved quickly south and then north through the lifeboat zone, 
clearing away ice each time. Also, it was seen by examining the participants individually 
that “R73” was the quickest to clear ice from the lifeboat zone (see Figure 5.22). This was 
done by approaching the lifeboat zone from the north, which created an ice-free channel 
north of the lifeboat zone and pushed some of the ice downstream. By considering the 
variability in approaches, it may be reasonable to consider an approach that combines some 
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of the best qualities of each individual of the group to create another approach that could 
be even better. 
 
Figure 5.22: Time when lifeboat zone is first ice free 
5.8. Conclusions 
Operational practices influence performance of shipping operations. It is not always 
obvious which practices will produce certain outcomes because of the dynamic conditions 
in which ships operate. This paper presents a method to help visualize the way certain 
practices influence the performance of an operation. The method is demonstrated through 
the application of an ice management simulator experiment. A metric is used to measure 
the performance of each participant. This helps understand the level of performance that is 
being achieved, but does not help understand why certain levels of performance are being 
achieved. In order to provide more insight into why participants are achieving low or high 
performance, functional signatures are used to monitor the system functionality. This paper 
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demonstrates some of the ways a comparison may be made to examine the performance 
data. In this example, enough insight was obtained to understand some qualities of high and 
low performance and suggest an approach for improving future performance. These are 
valuable insights for system management. 
Some people may have reservations about using data from ship simulators to manage real 
operations, which opens up a different discussion. However, the main focus of this paper 
is to present and demonstrate a novel method for managing ship operations. This method 
has been demonstrated using data from a ship simulator, but the method could be applied 
in the same manner to actual ship data should an operator wish to do so. 
The PMPM method is born of the need to make improvements to safety management. Some 
discussion of how safety management might be approached when using this method is 
warranted to more clearly link the method to the original safety management objectives of 
this thesis. The PMPM method is an investigative tool that allows users to closely monitor 
changes in functionality and compare them in terms of the influence on system 
performance. The method provides insight into the system but does not explicitly suggest 
how safety management decisions should be made. A question may be posed, as to how we 
know that we are making the best decision? In most cases, the best decision would be the 
decision that results in the best outcomes for the operation. However, safety management 
decisions need to be made prior to the outcomes being known so it is difficult to exercise 
that criterion for decision making at the decision time. This gap between decisions and 
future outcomes bring about inherent uncertainties that are usually dealt with by making 
some leap of faith that is bridged by your system resilience and robustness. If outcomes 
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cannot be guaranteed for safety management decisions, then another criterion for decisions 
might be, to make the most informed decisions as possible. By becoming more informed, 
a better understanding of the system will be the basis of the decision, which can serve to 
reduce the risk to unfortunate outcomes occurring as one traverses the gap between decision 
and outcome. The PMPM claims to improve the quality (and quantity) of information that 
is used to inform safety management decisions, which by the second criterion can translate 
into improvements to safety management.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1. Conclusions 
Safety is paramount for Arctic shipping operations. Many of the risks associated with ships 
in the Arctic are unaffordable, making learning from mistakes as the primary focus 
inappropriate. In this context, a more proactive approach to safety is needed. This research 
focuses on using the system and safety II paradigms for developing a methodology that can 
be used to inform safety management. These paradigms are the foundations for the 
performance measurement and process mapping/monitoring (PMPM) method that is 
presented in this work. The PMPM method marries qualitative techniques: the FRAM and 
functional signatures, with a quantitative technique: system performance measurement. 
The combination of quantitative and qualitative understandings that can be gained from the 
PMPM method provides a framework that allows for diagnostic safety management of 
complex socio-technical operations. The use of the FRAM provides guidance to monitor 
and assess the inner workings of operations. The incorporation of system performance 
measurement brings a quantifiable element to the FRAM that can aid assessors and decision 
makers in comparing different scenarios. System performance measurement allows the 
overall performance of an operation to be quantified. The concept of functional signatures 
is an extension of the current FRAM that can be used as a visual tool to bring more 
understanding regarding the inner workings of operations, in particular in the functional 
dynamics. This method is appropriate for safety management in Arctic shipping, but may 
be useful for other domains, especially if the operation is dynamic and socio-technical. 
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When this method has been demonstrated throughout this thesis, ship navigation has been 
area of application. When building the FRAM model for ship navigation, ship captains 
were used as the basis to inform the modelling. This provides information regarding the 
functions that ship captains perform when navigating ships. Also, the information regarding 
variability collected from the captains is relevant to the ways they perform their tasks, and 
how they might respond to certain operational conditions. The use of data from a ship 
simulator performing an ice management operation was also used to demonstrate the 
complete method presented in this thesis. From this data set it is demonstrated how to rank 
the overall performance for different system measurements, create their functional 
signatures, and possible ways to compare quantities of the functional signatures. These 
demonstrations can be used as starting points for future assessments in ship navigation or 
as a basis to transfer the method to other domains. 
6.2. Recommendations and Future Work 
This thesis shows the theoretical framework for the PMPM method and demonstrates it 
using a few applications to Arctic shipping. From the few limited applications of this 
method, it seems to be a reasonable approach. It is recommended that this method continue 
to be used to investigate safety. By using this method more, there is an opportunity to learn 
about specific applications and possibly about the overall utility of the method, and any 
limits to appropriate applications that may exist. There is an opportunity to be able to 
understand the signatures of certain intangible qualities of safety, such as safety culture. 
This can be explored by using the method to see if certain characteristics of safety culture 
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may emerge in a FRAM analysis, and by using system performance measurement there is 
a way to use quantification to measure the overall effect of those characteristics. 
Further quantification of this method may be desirable in the future. There are two possible 
ways that additional quantification may be used: 1) Develop a system for quantification of 
each functional output in a FRAM model and 2) have multi-variable system performance 
measurements. Quantification of individual functional inputs would allow for intermediate 
monitoring throughout the operation and provide a better opportunity to locate safety 
concerns within the system. This level of quantification is already achievable for functions 
that have outputs that are easily quantified. The challenge for the future work is to create a 
reasonable system for quantifying the outputs of functions that are difficult to measure on 
quantifiable scales. Multi-variable system performance measurements may allow for more 
complete representation of functionality through system measurements. The current 
approach uses a single measurement to quantify performance, which is then used to make 
judgments about its influence on functionality, which can inform safety management 
decisions. The guidance is to select a single measurement that represents the main objective 
of the operation. However, there could be cases where improving on that measurement may 
be at odds with improving on safety. A multi-variable approach that can synthesize variable 
measurements might be a useful way to overcome this. 
It may be useful to further develop techniques for visualizing functional signatures. More 
detailed techniques that allow functional dynamics to be monitored with higher precision 
may be an advantage. The current technique for functional signatures shows snapshots of 
the functionality in the operation over time. At any given time, the functional signature is 
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showing the functionality over a time range, even if that range can be reduced to a fairly 
short interval. It may be useful in the future to add a highlighted “spot” on the functional 
signature that shows the instantaneous location of functional activity on the signature. This 
technique could also be useful for visualizing functional activity in parallel paths of the 
functional signature, especially if the functional activity of those paths move at different 
rates. This improvement could be useful for visualizing complicated, time dependent 
operations.
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7. Appendix A 
      ICEHR – Application for Ethics Review (Secondary Use of Data) 
 
Project Info.  
 
File No: 20181986 
Project Title: Using FRAM to assess the performance of ice management for offshore 
installations using simulated environments. 
Principal Investigator: Mr. Doug Smith (Faculty of Engineering and Applied Science) 
Start Date: 2018/03/09 
End Date:  
Keywords: Engineering,Oil and Gas 
 
 
Related Awards:  
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Principal 
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Note
s 
2017176
3 
Brian Veitch  
Safety 
manageme
nt of arctic 
shipping 
 
RDC 
Program:  ArcticTECH 
Program 
N/A  
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Agreement 
Account#:  212013 41000 
2000 
Requested
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CAD 249,061.00 
Awarded:  CAD 249,061.00 
 
 
PROJECT TOTALS:  
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:  
CAD 249,061.0
0 
Awarded : 
CAD 249,061.0
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Project Team Info.  
Principal Investigator  
Prefix: Mr. 
Last Name: Smith 
First Name: Doug 
Affiliation: Faculty of Engineering and Applied Science 
Rank: Doctoral Student 
Email: r35drs@mun.ca 
Phone1: 709-427-4275 
Phone2:  
Fax: 709-864-4042 
Primary Address:  
Institution: MUN (STJ) 
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Country: Canada 
Comments:  
 
Other Project Team Members  
 
Prefix 
Last 
Name 
First 
Nam
e 
Affiliation 
Role In 
Project 
Email 
Mr.  Veitch Erik 
Faculty of 
Engineering and 
Applied 
Science\Departm
ent of Ocean and 
Naval 
Architectural 
Engineering 
Co-
Investigat
or 
erik.veitch@mun
.ca 
Dr.  Veitch 
Bria
n 
Faculty of 
Engineering and 
Applied 
Science\Departm
ent of Ocean and 
Naval 
Architectural 
Engineering 
Supervisor bveitch@mun.ca 
 
Common Questions  
 
1. Degree Program  
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# Question Answer 
1.1  
Please indicate the project program 
related to the application. 
Doctoral Dissertation 
1.2  If OTHER, please specify.  N/A 
2. Purpose of Study and Research Questions 
 
# Question Answer 
2.1  
Explain the purpose, objectives, and 
hypotheses of the project in non-
technical, plain language. (Maximum 
500 words) 
Prior to this study, we have built a 
model using the functional resonance 
analysis method (FRAM) of the way 
shipping operations function. This 
modeling technique requires that the 
tasks used to carry out the operation be 
represented as functional nodes and 
the collection of nodes (tasks) should 
have connections that describe the 
nature of the inter-dependencies 
between the tasks that are being 
modeled. To verify this model and 
demonstrate it's utility, it should be 
used by collecting data and comparing 
the modeled results to the practical 
results. The ideal data source for this is 
to collect data from a shipping 
operation. This will give you a sense of 
how well your model reflects realities 
of a shipping operation. However, we 
have had trouble recruiting 
participants from actually shipping 
operations, which we believe is due to 
time commitments and liability 
concerns of what they will be asked. 
Another opportunity to collect data to 
demonstrate this modelling technique 
is using ship simulator data. An 
experiment using an ice management 
simulator has been conducted by Erik 
Veitch et al. This experiment collects 
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data from participants to drive a 
simulated vessel to clear ice away from 
a life boat launch zone for an offshore 
petroleum installation. This data can be 
used to be analyzed by the FRAM. The 
FRAM will assess the tasks that were 
completed by each participant in the 
simulator and connect their task 
performance to their ability to clear ice 
in the simulated environment. 
3. Data Characteristics and Background 
 
# Question Answer 
3.1  Select the relevant data type(s): Data anonymized AFTER collection 
3.2  
Provide a summary description of the 
source data to be used in the proposed 
project. Indicate the nature / type of 
data, how and why it was originally 
collected and by whom, and how you 
will obtain access to the dataset(s).  
The source data is "Operating window 
for moored floating structures in harsh 
environments." PI: Erik Veitch and File 
No: 20170540. The data was collected 
by Erik Veitch under the conditions of 
the above mentioned project. I will 
obtain the post-processed anonymized 
data. 
3.3  
Describe the size of the dataset(s) 
and/or number of original participants 
in the data collection. 
There are 72 participants in this 
experiment. Each file contains 30 mins 
worth of data which was recorded from 
the simulator, including vessel speed, 
heading, ice load and ice 
concentration. 
3.4  
Explain any criteria that will be used to 
identify / select relevant data such as 
specific participant attributes, periods 
of time, or geographical location.  
This assessment will not consider any 
particular attributes of participants. 
Only the outputs from the ice 
management simulator. 
3.5  
Was any of the source data originally 
collected for research purposes? 
Yes 
3.6  
If YES, specify the REB that approved 
the original data collection. If the 
original REB was ICEHR, provide the 
The source data is "Operating window 
for moored floating structures in harsh 
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ICEHR file number. If the original data 
collection did NOT have REB approval, 
explain why not. 
environments." PI: Erik Veitch and File 
No: 20170540. 
3.7  
If the source data was NOT originally 
collected for research purposes, 
indicate the purpose(s) of the original 
data collection. 
 
3.8  If OTHER, please specify. N/A 
3.9  
Was the data collected with consent 
from participants? 
Yes 
3.10  
If YES, describe the elements of 
consent regarding data sharing and 
future use that participants agreed to. 
If available, upload a BLANK or 
REDACTED copy of the consent form 
used for the original data collection in 
the Attachments tab. 
See informed consent form from: 
"Operating window for moored 
floating structures in harsh 
environments." PI: Erik Veitch and File 
No: 20170540. 
4. Access to Data, Privacy, and Confidentiality 
 
# Question Answer 
4.1  
Identify the source(s) of the data (e.g. 
government agency / department, 
other public body, or private company 
/ individual) 
The source data is from "Operating 
window for moored floating structures 
in harsh environments." PI: Erik Veitch 
and File No: 20170540. 
4.2  
Is the data available in the public 
domain? (See description above) 
No 
4.3  
Identify the data custodian / holder for 
each data source identified in 4.1 and 
upload a copy of the correspondence 
communicating approval and/or 
granting access to the data in the 
Attachments tab. 
Erik Veitch. All communication 
regarding this secondary use of this 
data was verbal. 
4.4  
Describe how data will be securely 
obtained / transferred and stored for 
use in this project. 
The data will be transferred as 
anonymized excel files that contains 
data on the simulated ship and ice 
conditions in each simulation. 
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4.5  
Are there specific retention and/or 
destruction parameters placed on the 
data by the data holder / custodian? If 
YES, discuss. 
No 
4.6  
As per Memorial University’s policy on 
Integrity in Scholarly Research, all 
primary data resulting from scholarly 
activity must be retained for a 
MINIMUM of 5 years. Please provide 
details regarding your anticipated plans 
for retention and/or disposal of the 
data. 
After 5 years the data will be disposed 
of as per the the conditions of file No: 
20170540. 
4.7  
Will data be shared with or accessed by 
anyone other than the principal 
investigator? 
Yes 
4.8  
If YES, describe how data will be shared 
and in what format. 
The data files will not be shared, but 
the results from the FRAM analysis will 
be presented in a Journal Publication. 
4.9  
Will data from this study be 
contributed to a larger study? 
No 
4.10  
If YES, identify any other institutions 
and/or external team members 
involved in the larger study. 
N/A 
5. Data Linkage 
 
# Question Answer 
5.1  
Will the proposed project require data 
linkage? 
No 
5.2  
If YES, describe how confidentiality of 
the data will be protected, who will 
perform the data linkage, and how the 
merged files will be safeguarded? 
N/A 
5.3  
If YES, is this linkage likely to result in 
re-identification of participants or the 
production of identifiable information? 
If so, how? 
N/A 
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5.4  
IF YES to 5.3, how will the identity or 
potentially identifying information 
relating to original participants be 
safeguarded?  
N/A 
6. Sharing / Disseminating Results 
 
# Question Answer 
6.1  
Describe if / how the results of this 
project will be shared with the research 
community and/or the general public.  
The results of the FRAM analysis on this 
data will be presented in a journal 
publication. These results will not have 
potential identifiers. 
6.2  
If applicable, describe if / how the 
results of this project will be shared 
with participants from whom the data 
was originally collected, relevant 
agencies, or communities. 
N/A 
7. Funding, Contracts, and Agreements 
 
# Question Answer 
7.1  
Please select the appropriate funding 
status for this project: 
Funded 
7.2  
If funded, or funding is being sought, 
please indicate the funding 
agency/sponsor. If there are multiple 
sources of funding please enter each on 
a new line. 
Lloyd's Register Foundation (LRF) 
7.3  
If you indicated in 7.1 that funding is 
being sought, specify whether or not 
this project will proceed if funding is 
not obtained.  
 
7.4  
Will funds be administered through 
Memorial’s Research Grant and 
Contract Services (RGCS) office? 
Yes 
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7.5  
If you answered NO or OTHER to 7.4, 
explain. 
N/A 
7.6  
If YES to 7.4, specify the principal 
investigator for the associated funding 
AND provide the RGCS Awards file 
number(s): 
PI is Brian Veitch and Faisal Khan. The 
Award title is "Scenario based risk 
management for Arctic shipping and 
operations." 
7.7  
Is there a funded or non-funded 
contract or research / partnership 
agreement associated with this 
research? 
Yes 
7.8  
If YES to 7.7, specify the parties to the 
contract / agreement, and discuss the 
contract / agreement provisions 
relating to intellectual property, data 
access, and data ownership. Upload a 
copy of the agreement / contract in the 
Attachments tab. 
See attachment 
8. Conflict of Interest 
 
# Question Answer 
8.1  
Is there any aspect of a 
contract/agreement that could put any 
member of the research team in a 
potential conflict of interest? 
No 
8.2  
If YES, identify the conflict(s) and 
discuss how they will be mitigated. 
N/A 
9. Pre-Submission Checklist 
 
# Question Answer 
9.1  
All questions have been answered in 
the space allowed (Including "N/A" 
where appropriate). 
Yes 
9.2  
A copy of the Principal Investigator’s 
TCPS2 Tutorial Certificate of 
Yes 
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Completion is included in the 
Attachments tab. 
9.3  
A copy of any funded or non-funded 
contract or research / partnership 
agreement is included in the 
Attachments tab. 
Yes 
9.4  
A copy of the correspondence 
regarding data access from the data 
holder / custodian has been attached in 
the Attachments tab. 
Not Applicable 
9.5  
If this study primarily involves data 
from an Aboriginal population, a copy 
of the research agreement or letter of 
support from the relevant community 
groups and boards is included. 
No 
9.6  
The supervisor signature form is 
included. (Students Only) 
Yes 
9.7  
(Faculty / Staff) If funded, the project 
funding has been linked under ‘Related 
Awards’ on the Project Info tab.  
No 
9.8  
(Student / Postdoc) If funded, the 
‘Funded Projects’ section has been 
completed on the attached Supervisor 
signature page. 
Yes 
10. Declaration 
 
# Question Answer 
10.1  
I have read, and understand that I must 
comply with, Memorial University's 
Policy on Ethics of Research Involving 
Human Participants and the Tri-Council 
Policy Statement on Ethical Conduct for 
Research Involving Humans (TCPS2 - 
2014). 
Agree 
10.2  
I will ensure that all procedures 
performed under the project will be 
Agree 
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conducted in accordance with the 
TCPS2 (2014) and all relevant 
university, provincial, national, and 
international policies and regulations 
that govern the collection and use of 
personally identifiable information 
and/or any other data in research 
involving human participants.  
10.3  
I agree to conduct the research subject 
to Section 3 (Guiding Ethical Principles) 
and accept the responsibilities as 
outlined in Section 18 (Responsibilities 
of Researchers) of Memorial 
University's Policy on Ethics of 
Research Involving Human 
Participants. 
Agree 
10.4  
I understand that if I misrepresent 
and/or fail to accurately and fully 
disclose any aspects of the research, 
my ethics clearance may be suspended.  
Agree 
10.5  
I understand that Article 6.16 of the 
TCPS2 (2014) requires that I submit an 
amendment request to ICEHR before 
making any changes to my approved 
protocol that may affect participants 
including, but not limited to, changes in 
recruitment, informed consent, test 
instruments, and/or tasks or 
interventions involved in the research. 
I understand that changes 
implemented without approval 
constitute a violation of the TCPS2 
(2014) and Memorial University policy.  
Agree 
10.6  
I understand that Article 6.14 
(Continuing Research Ethics Review) of 
the TCPS2 (2014) requires that I submit 
an annual update for each year my 
project is active, and a final report after 
my project is completed. 
Agree 
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10.7  
If there is any occurrence of an adverse 
event(s), I will report it to ICEHR 
immediately by submitting an Adverse 
Event Report. 
Agree 
 
Attachments  
Doc / Agreement 
Version 
Date 
File Name 
Descriptio
n 
Informed Consent 
Form 
2018/03/
04  
Appendix-A-Consent-Form-
rev6.pdf 
Original 
informed 
consent 
form  
Other REB 
Application/Appro
val 
2018/02/
28  
LRF_Agreement_signedMUN.PD
F 
N/A  
Secondary Use of 
Data Approval 
Letter 
2018/03/
05  
Data-Holder-Agreement-for-
Secondary-Use.pdf 
N/A  
Signature Form 
2018/03/
01  
supervisorform_ethicssigned.pd
f 
N/A  
Signature Form 
2018/03/
05  
supervisorform_ethicssignedrgc
s.pdf 
Updated 
supervisor
's 
signature 
page  
TCPS2 Certificate 
2018/02/
28  
TCPSComplete_doug.pdf N/A  
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TCPS2 Certificate 
2018/03/
05  
tcps2_core_certificate.pdf 
Supervisor
's tcps2 
core 
certificate  
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8. Appendix B 
 
 
Name of function  Controlled Propane Flow 
Description  
The main function of the is to supply 
propane in a controlled manner 
Aspect  Description of aspect 
Input 
Feed controlled automatically 
Feed controlled manually 
Output   
Precondition   
Resource   
Control   
Time   
 
 
 
Name of function  Manually Operate Valve 
Description  
The valve is adjusted manually in the 
event that the automatic system is not 
functioning 
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Aspect  Description of aspect 
Input  Manual intervention needed 
Output  Feed controlled manually 
Precondition  Worker available 
Resource   
Control   
Time   
 
Name of function  Automatically Operate Valve 
Description  
Actuator adjusts valve automatically to 
achieve desired flow rate 
Aspect  Description of aspect 
Input  Voltage relayed 
Output  Feed controlled automatically 
Precondition   
Resource   
Control   
Time   
 
Name of function  Delegate Worker Responsibility 
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Description  
Management must delegate worker(s) to 
be responsible for monitoring the 
automatic system and operating the 
manual valve 
Aspect  Description of aspect 
Input   
Output  Worker available 
Precondition   
Resource   
Control   
Time   
 
 
 
Name of function  Alert Worker 
Description  
Alarm sounds to alert worker when it is 
detected that automatic control is not 
functioning properly 
Aspect  Description of aspect 
Input  Feed controlled automatically 
Output  Worker Alerted 
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Precondition   
Resource   
Control   
Time   
 
Name of function  Relay pressure 
Description  
Relays the pressure difference (voltage 
signal) to the actuator 
Aspect  Description of aspect 
Input  Pressure controlled 
Output  Voltage relayed 
Precondition   
Resource   
Control   
Time   
 
Name of function  Set Desired Flow Rate 
Description  
Calibrate the pressure controller to send 
required voltage to actuator to adjust 
automatic valve to achieve desired flow 
rate after pressure measurement 
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Aspect  Description of aspect 
Input   
Output  Set flow rate 
Precondition   
Resource   
Control   
Time   
 
 
Name of function  Measure Pressure 
Description  
Pressure sensor measures the pressure 
and sends to the pressure controller 
Aspect  Description of aspect 
Input   
Output  Pressure measured 
Precondition   
Resource   
Control   
Time   
 
Name of function  Control Pressure 
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Description  
Measured pressure is compared with 
desired pressure by the pressure 
controller 
Aspect  Description of aspect 
Input  Pressure measured 
Output  Pressure controlled 
Precondition   
Resource   
Control  Set flow rate 
Time   
 
Name of function  Monitor Automatic System 
Description  
A worker must monitor the automatic 
control system to ensure it is functioning 
properly 
Aspect  Description of aspect 
Input  Feed controlled automatically 
Output  Manual intervention needed 
Precondition  Worker available 
Resource   
Control  Set flow rate 
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Time  Worker Alerted 
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